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WAR, LAW & LIBERAL THOUGHT: THE USE OF FORCE IN
THE REAGAN YEARS
David P. Fidler*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Reagan administration has been severely criticized for the attitude it
displayed towards international law on the use of force. Perhaps excluding the
Vietnam years, no previous American administration has come under such heavy
and repeated attack for its attitude concerning the role of international law in
American foreign policy. More than a few actions have been criticized; many
attacks explicitly accused the Reagan administration of treating the international
legal rules on the use of force as unimportant. 1 The conventional view appears to
weighed in the balance of
be that the Reagan administration has been
2
international law and justice and found wanting.
The first purpose of this article is to analyze critically the conventional
wisdom about the Reagan administration's handling of the international law on
the use of force. My analysis proceeds in two parts. First, I examine the
conventional critique of the Reagan administration's handling of the use of force,
as well as the tradition of liberal thought on international law - the liberal
progressive tradition - that inspires that critique (Part I). Second, I explore the
tradition of liberal thought on international law - the liberal realist tradition that informs the Reagan administration's perspective. In comparing the two
traditions, I argue that the conventional wisdom about the Reagan
administration's perspective on the international law on the use of force not only
misunderstands the administration's position but also fails to do justice to the
liberal progressive tradition (Part II). For clarity and focus, I will concentrate on
the Reagan administration's policy towards Nicaragua. Of all the events in the

* David P. Fidler is an associate with Stinson, Mag & Fizzell, P.C.; B.C.L.,
Oxford University (1991); J.D., Harvard University (1991); M.Phil., Oxford
University (1988); B.A., University of Kansas (1986).
1. See, e.g., Paul H. Kriesberg, Does the U.S. Government Think That
InternationalLaw is Important?, 11 Yale J. Int'l L. 479 (1986).
2. The Reagan administration came under attack on international legal issues other
than the use of force. Two other very controversial areas that will not be dealt with in
this article are the law of the sea and human rights. See Allen Sultan, The
InternationalRule of Law under the Reagan Administration, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 245
(1985) and Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might:
International Law and the Use of Force 37, 68 n.28 (1989) [hereinafter Right v.
Might].

46

Arizona Journalof Internationaland Comparative Law [Vol. 11, No. 1

Reagan years that touched upon legal issues on the use of force, the Nicaraguan
policy produced the sharpest disagreement and discord, as well as a rare and
controversial ruling on use of force law by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).3
The second purpose of the article is to examine whether the Reagan
administration's policies against Nicaragua accord with the liberal realist tradition
in theory and practice (Parts I and IV). The third purpose of the article is to
transcend the policies of a specific administration to explore the unsettling
challenge the use of force poses for liberal thought. I delve into the traditions of
liberal thought on international law because the "great debate" 4 about
international law and the use of force in the Reagan years cannot be properly
understood without going back to the philosophical and historical roots of both
sides in the debate. As the Washington Quarterly noted, the 1980's left "both
Democrats and Republicans in a quandary about the basic relation of international
law to the national interest and to the use of force in diplomacy." 5 My analysis,
to a large extent, goes back to the basics of the relationship between the use of
force, international law, and liberal thought on international politics. 6 What
follows covers familiar ground, but familiarity cannot disguise that the ground
remains controversial, complex, enigmatic, and disturbing.

3. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27).
4. David J. Scheffer, Introduction: The Great Debate of the 1980s, in Right v.
Might, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Force, U.S. Diplomacy, and InternationalLaw, Wash. Q., Autumn 1988, at 105.
Another commentator also stated that, "[s]ince the breakup of the postwar foreignpolicy consensus in the late 1960s, the United States has found itself in an intellectual
quandary about what the relationship of international law to foreign policy ought to
be." Albert R. Coll, InternationalLaw and U.S. Foreign Policy: Present Challenges
and Opportunities,Wash. Q., Autumn 1988, at 107, 110.
6. Jeane Kirkpatrick writes that "[a]n examination of the philosophical
foundations of the liberal tradition is particularly relevant to a consideration of
Ronald Reagan, his presidency, and his administration, because the president and
many of his principal advisors see themselves as purveyors and defenders of the
classical liberal tradition in politics, economics, and society." Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
The Reagan Phenomenon, in Legitimacy and Force 389, 393 (1989) [hereinafter
Legitimacy and Force].
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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S CRITICS AND THE
LIBERAL PROGRESSIVE TRADITION

A. The Conventional Critique of the Reagan Administration
The dominant critique of the Reagan administration's handling of the
international law on the use of force comprises three elements. First, critics
charge that the Reagan administration violated the international legal rules on the
use of force and treated the international legal process and institutions with
disrespect. Second, the critique holds that these violations and disrespect
represent the fruit of the Reagan administration's "realism," a perspective on
international politics that dismisses international law as a utopian toy. Third, the
critics lament that the Reagan administration abandoned the American tradition of
fostering the international rule of law in resolving international conflicts.
1. Violations and Disrespect
According to its critics, the Reagan administration repeatedly violated a
principle norm of the contemporary international system: the prohibition on the
use or threat of force laid down in article 2(4) of the United Nations (U.N.)
Charter. 7 Article 2(4) not only represents a binding treaty obligation on the
United States, but, according to many publicists and the ICJ, customary
international law on the use of force is identical with article 2(4), and the
prohibition on the use or threat of force is a peremptory rule of international law,
orjus cogens.8 Violations of international law's prohibition on the use of force,
then, represent actions that strike against one of the cornerstones of the
international legal order.
Publicists most frequently charge that the Reagan administration violated the
prohibition on the use of force in the United States' invasion of Grenada, Contra

7. Article 2, 4 states: "All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4.
8. In Nicaraguav. United States, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) "held that
customary law and the law of the 'Charter were essentially congruent in relevant
respects... ." Henkin, supra note 2, at 67 n.22. Cassese writes that "the ban on the
use of force has become part of international peremptory law orjus cogens." Antonio
Cassese, International Law in a Divided World 141 (1986). The ICJ also made
reference to the concept of jus cogens in relation to article 2(4)'s prohibition on the
use or threat of force. See Gordon A. Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens,
81 Am. J. Int'l. L. 93 (1987).
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policy in Nicaragua, and bombing of Libya. Writers described the invasion of
Grenada as "a far-reaching deviation from the traditional rules governing the use
of force in international relations," 9 as a "flagrant violation of international
law," 10° and, more harshly, as "no different from those [invasions] of the axis
powers prior to and during World War II, or the much more recent Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan... ."I1 Similar attacks populate the international legal
literature in relation to the United States' Nicaraguan policy1 2 and to the bombing
of Libya. 13 The literature also contains accusations that the Reagan
administration breached the law on the use of force in relation to the United
14
States' military interception of the aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro pirates,
military intervention in Lebanon, 15 and indirect military
support for insurgency
16
movements in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia.
The "indictment" of the Reagan administration as crafted in academic
literature received its day in court as far as the Nicaraguan policy was concerned in
Nicaraguav. U.S. Nicaragua filed a complaint with the ICJ against the United

States on April 9, 1984, accusing the Reagan administration of flagrant
violations of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and of customary international law
17
in its support for the Nicaraguan resistance movement known as the Contras.

In spite of the United States' withdrawal from the proceedings on the merits, the
ICJ held that the United States had violated the customary international law

9. Stuart S. Malawer, Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-87: The "Reagan
Corollary" of InternationalLaw, 29 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 85, 93 (1988).
10. Abram Chayes, Grenada Was Illegally Invaded, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at
A35.
11. Sultan, supra note 2, at 252. See also Edward Gordon et al., InternationalLaw
and the United States Action in Grenada:A Report, Int'l Law., Spring 1984, at 331;
Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the
Lawfulness of Invasions, 78 Am. J. Int'l. L. 131 (1984); Detlev F. Vagts,
InternationalLaw under Time Pressure:Grading the GrenadaTake-Home Examination,
78 Am. J. Int'l. L. 162 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Daniel P. Moynihan, Loyalties (1984); Louis R. Beres, Ignoring
InternationalLaw: U.S. Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in Central America, 14
Denver J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 76 (1985); Henkin, supra note 2, at 54; Christopher C.
Joyner & Michael A. Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua:Reflections on the
Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 Va. J. Int'l. L. 621 (1985); Jules Lobel
& Michael Ratner, Is United States Military Intervention in Central America Illegal?,
Hum. Rts. Q., Fall 1984, at 22; Malawer, supra note 9, at 94-95; and Paul S. Reichler
& David Wippman, United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua:A Rejoinder, 11
Yale J. Int'l L. 462 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 2, at 54 and Malawer, supra note 9, at 102.
14. Malawer, supra note 9, at 99.
15. Id. at 93.
16. Id. at 104.
17. Application of the Republic of Nicaragua, 15, at 11.
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prohibiting the use of force against another state in certain actions it had taken in
supporting the Contras. 18
The alleged repeated violations of the international law on the use of force
provided evidence for the accusation that the Reagan administration treated rules
of international law callously. As Henkin observes, the Reagan administration's
justifications for its actions in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Libya were widely rejected
by international lawyers, other governments, and international organizations. 19
Coil attributes the Reagan administration's failure to articulate persuasive legal
justifications for its actions to the lack of "a sophisticated understanding of the
relationship of international law to a successful foreign policy."20 Coil locates
this supposed callousness or unsophistication of the Reagan administration in
"the largely negative view of international law prevalent within most
conservative circles of the Republican party .... 21
For many, the height of the Reagan administration's callousness occurred
when it withdrew from the proceedings in Nicaraguav. U.S. after the ICJ ruled
on November 26, 1984 that it had jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims and that
the claims were admissible. 22 As part of its explanation for withdrawing, the
Reagan administration stated that "[w]e will not risk U.S. national security by
presenting such sensitive material in public or before a Court that includes two
judges from the Warsaw pact nations."23 The decision to withdraw and the
attempt "to disparage the judicial character and integrity of the Court '24 provoked
condemnation of the Reagan administration's action. 25 One critic equated the
Reagan administration's boycott of the merits stage of Nicaraguav. U.S. to the
Khomeini government's refusal to appear before the ICJ in the Iranian hostages
case. 26 The withdrawal episode, thus, helped foster the belief that not only did
the Reagan administration care little about the international law governing the

18. See Herbert W. Briggs, The International Court of Justice Lives Up to Its
Name, 81 Am. J. Int'l. L. 78, 79 (1987). Since the ICJ considered article 2(4) and
customary international law on the use of force identical in substance, the ICJ ruling
against the United States constitutes a de facto ruling that the Reagan administration
violated article 2(4). Id. at 79-80.
19. Henkin, supra note 2, at 54.
20. Coll, supra note 5, at 117.
21. Id. at 116-17.
22. See Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392
(Judgment of Nov. 26).
23. Text of U.S. Statement on Withdrawal From Case Before World Court, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 4.
24. Abram Chayes, Nicaragua,the United States, and the World Court, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. 1445, 1447 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Scorning the World Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, § 4, at 22,
and Carlos Andres Perez's Solution, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1985, §1, at A18.
26. Sultan, supra note 2, at 259. The Iranian hostages case's official title is United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment
of May 24).
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use of force but that it also cared no more about the procedures and institutions of
international law and justice.
2.The Reagan Administration's Realism
According to the conventional critique, the Reagan administration adhered to
the perspective on international politics known as "realism," which serves to
explain the administration's actions. In the eyes of critics, the Reagan
administration's realism comprised a rejection of the role of law in international
politics, an emphasis on power as the key determinate of foreign policy, and a
penchant for unilateral action in pursuit of the national interest defined in terms
of power.
Realism attaches great importance to enforcement in relation to law,
following Hobbes' famous statement that law "properly is the word of him, that
by right hath command over others." 2 7 Rules, such as those found in
international law, are not properly "law" because international law lacks any
enforcement mechanism common to all states. International law, then, is
nothing more than what Austin termed "positive international morality. ' 2 8 As
such, it occupies a lowly place in realism's scheme of international politics.
Critics point to the Reagan administration's demotion of international law as
evidence of realism's influence. Highet detected a "decline of public international
law and institutions as important influences in the conduct of United States
foreign policy."2 9 Sultan heard "an unmuted chorus articulating an aggravated
insensitivity - some would say arrogance - towards respect for international
law on the part of President Reagan and his policy makers. '30 Coll observes that
within the Republican party "international law has been relegated to the realm of
the useless and irrelevant, if not outright dangerous, fictions with which hard
headed statesmen need not concern themselves."3 1
The conventional critique also notes the Reagan administration's elevation of
the role of power politics in international affairs. Realism sees international
politics as a struggle for power in which moral restraints in the guise of law are
ineffective. Realism divorces the principles of power politics from the principles
of morality and law. Many saw this process at work in the Reagan

27. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 217 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968). Carr noted that
the "realist view of law was first clearly and explicitly stated by Hobbes, who defined
law as a command: lus est quod iussum est." Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis,
1919-1939 176 (2d ed. 1946).
28. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society 130 (1977).
29. Robert F. Turner, InternationalLaw,' the Reagan Doctrine, and World Peace:
Going Back to the Future, Wash. Q., Autumn 1988, at 119, 119 n.1 (quoting Keith
Highet, "The Old Man and the Sea," address at Columbia Law School, June 10, 1987).
30. Sultan, supra note 2, at 245.
31. Coll, supra note 5, at 110.
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administration. Moynihan wrote that "there has been a steady erosion of the
32
active conviction that law is the basis on which we conduct our foreign affairs"
and that the United States increasingly responds to international events "in terms
of a narrow and almost normless realpolitik." 3 3 Boyle commented that the
Reagan administration comprised "a group of men and women who were
elementally lawless and thoroughly Machiavellian in their perception of
international relations and in their conduct of foreign affairs." 3 4 Chayes
suggested that President Reagan believed that in foreign affairs he was a law unto

himself.35 Falk noted that the Reagan administration was following the Soviet
Union and many Third World36states in disregarding international law's normative
restraints on the use of force.
Realism was also seen as influencing the Reagan administration's alleged
preference to act unilaterally in pursuit of a national interest defined narrowly in
terms of power. The dictum of one political realist, Hans Morgenthau, that
"statesmen should think and act in terms of interest defined as power" seemed to
animate the Reagan administration's foreign policy. 37 The Reagan
administration, according to the critique, pursued its power interest unilaterally
rather than through cooperation based on legal principles and procedures, thus
ignoring not only international law but also the interests of other states. 38 Thus,
the critics draw a composite picture of a realist administration pursuing an illegal,
normless, power-seeking, unilateralist, and nationalistic foreign policy.

32. Daniel P. Moynihan, A Commitment to Law as a Condition of Bipartisanship,
Wash. Q. White Paper, 1984, at 33, 34.
33. Moynihan, supra note 12, at 77.
34. Francis A. Boyle, World Politics and International Law 290 (1985).
35. Stuart Taylor Jr., Man in the News: The American Accuser, N.Y. Times, Apr.
11, 1984, at AS.
36. Richard A. Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International
Relations, 10 Yale J. Int'l. L. 263, 265 (1985).
37. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5 (5th ed. 1978). On
Morgenthau's ideas and influence, see Peter Gellman, Hans J. Morgenthau and the
Legacy of Political Realism, 14 Rev. Intl. Stud. 247 (1988) and Stanley Hoffmann,
Hans Morgenthau: The Limits and Influence of "Realism," in Janus and Minerva:
Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics 70 (1987) [hereinafter
Janus and Minerva]. Malawer argued that the Reagan administration's unilateral
pursuit of national interests "appears to be within the Morgenthau-Kennan school of
foreign policy realism." Malawer, supra note 9, at 85. Kennan is another well-known
American realist. See George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (1951).
38. Henkin, supra note 2, at 68 n.28; Malawer, supra note 9, at 86 n.9. Another
writer noted that the "Reagan Administration, it is regularly contended, was more
nationalist in outlook than any of its postwar predecessors....

In turn, this outlook

sanctioned a diplomatic style that had a marked propensity for unilateralism." Robert
Tucker, Reagan's Foreign Policy, 68 Foreign Aff. 1, 5 (1989).
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3. Abandoning the American Tradition of Fostering the Rule of Law in
International Relations
Critics find that the Reagan administration's violations of international law,
disrespect for international legal institutions and procedures, and realism also cut
against the American tradition of fostering the rule of law in international
relations. 39 Eugene Rostow describes the American tradition allegedly abandoned
by the Reagan administration:
From the day that American Presidents and Secretaries of State emerged
as actors in world politics, they became important spokesmen for
international law, and contributed disproportionately to its development.
During much of the nineteenth-century, Americans pressed international
arbitration and international tribunals as means to achieve the peaceful
resolution of international conflict. And Americans played a critical part
in the drafting and adoption both of the League Covenant and of the
United Nations Charter.'
Americans played an instrumental role in creating both the international law
prohibiting the use or threat of force embodied in article 2(4) and the international
legal institution and procedures of the ICJ. The critique holds that the Reagan
administration abandoned both of these American achievements.
On the rule governing the use of force, Chayes writes: "The current official
United States position thus seems to be that the use of force is a legitimate
instrument of foreign policy. That position turns its back on the long and costly
effort, in large part led by this country, to establish the contrary." 4 1 On the
international legal institution and procedures embodied in the ICJ, Glennon notes:
"The United States has - or had - long liked to think of itself as one of the
most enthusiastic supporters of international adjudication. .

.

. The U.S.

withdrawal from the [ICJ's] compulsory jurisdiction received little press attention;
few Americans realize how radically the United States has departed from longstanding tradition." 42 The Reagan administration's critics saw the administration

39. Malawer complained that "[tihe legacy of the Reagan Administration's foreign
policy ... is contrary to traditional United States support for international law and
multilateral cooperation." Malawer, supra note 9, at 108-09. Turner noted that
Reagan administration policies "have contributed to a growing perception, even
among some of our closest allies, that we no longer place the great importance upon
the rule of law that once characterized our international behavior." Robert Turner,
InternationalLaw, the Use of Force, and Reciprocity: A Comment on Professor
Higgins' Overview, 25 Atlantic Community Q. 160 (1987).
40. Eugene V. Rostow, The Ideal in Law 272 (1978).
41. Chayes, supra note 24, at 1480-81.
42. Michael J. Glennon, Protecting the Court's Institutional Interests: Why Not
the Marbujy Approach? 81 Am. J.Int'l. L. 121, 125 (1987).
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as a "giant step backward" for international law and the American tradition of
fostering the rule of law in international affairs. 43

B.

Traditions of Liberal Thought

The belief that international law is a critical means to control the use of force
in international politics animates the international legal critics of the Reagan
administration. As the critics argued, fostering the international legal control of
force has been a distinguished American tradition. Understanding this belief and
the tradition in which it is manifest will be central to analyzing the merit of the
conventional critique of the Reagan administration and the struggle of liberal
thought to come to grips with international politics.
The belief in the promise of international law represents an important part of
what I call the "liberal progressive" tradition of thought about international
politics. The liberal progressive tradition forms one of four different liberal
perspectives on international relations. I will examine two perspectives, realism
and liberal realism, in Part 191. Here I will present the other two perspectives,
liberalism and liberal progressivism, and will focus on the liberal progressive
tradition because it is the tradition in which the Reagan administration's
international legal critics belong.
1. Liberalism
Liberalism holds that international relations are not inherently characterized
by a state of war and that great schemes of improvement and transformation are
not required. The two major thinkers in this tradition are John Locke and David
Hume. 44 Locke's perspective on international politics flows from his analysis of
the state of nature. Locke argued that the state of nature is not characterized by
violence and fear but instead by peace and goodwill. 45 The individual in the state
of nature follows a law of nature, which obliges each individual to harm no other
person's life, liberty, health, or property. 4 6 While some individuals will
transgress against the law of nature, Locke believed that the law of nature
prescribes that aggressors may be punished not only by the immediate victim but
by everyone else in the state of nature as well.47 This system of self-help,
43. Turner, supra note 29, at 119.
44. See Stanley Hoffmann, Liberalism and InternationalAffairs, in Janus and
Minerva, supra note 37, at 402.
45. John Locke, in The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings
from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson 41, 42 (Arnold Wolfers & Lawrence W. Martin
eds., 1956) [hereinafter The Anglo-American Tradition].
46. Id.
47. Id. at 43.

54

Arizona Journalof Internationaland Comparative Law [Vol. 11, No. 1

however, creates inconveniences that taint the state of nature. 48 Locke's solution
to these inconveniences is the formation of a representative civil government.4 9
Locke recognizes that international politics is a system of self-help as well,
but he does not advocate a world government to eradicate its inconveniences.
Instead, Locke believed that international relations was in no need of reform for
two reasons. First, Locke saw the law of nature governing the international state
of nature as it governed the individual state of nature. The law of nature, thus,
imposed significant restraints on states. Second, Locke believed that commerce
could strengthen the restraints imposed by the law of nature by allowing states to
grow rich without conquest. 5051 Locke, therefore, saw no pressing need to
transform international relations.
Hume reached the same conclusion but by a slightly different route. Hume
believed that the same moral rules that applied to individuals applied to states as
well. Hume's "three fundamental rules of justice" were: (1) the stability of
possessions; (2) the transfer of property by consent; and (3) the performance of
promises. 52 Hume acknowledged, however, that these rules had less force among
states than among individuals. 53 Yet Hume, like Locke, did not consider
international relations in need of reform for two reasons. First, Hume saw the
balance of power as a moderating force on state behavior.5 4 Second, Hume
believed that a state's interest in wealth and power was best satisfied not through
conquest and colonies but through commerce; a commercial policy would enhance
55
the prospects for the three fundamental rules ofjustice being obeyed by states.
Liberalism's model of international relations, then, envisions independent
states pursuing their interests in an international system marked by moderation,
cooperation, and stability. The guarantors of the benign system are features
inherent in the system: the law of nature, trade, and the balance of power.
2. Liboe-al Progressivism
The liberal progressive tradition holds that international politics needs
transforming, can be transformed, and should be transformed into a peaceful and
just system. Liberal progressives accept the realists' grim depiction of
international political reality,5 6 but they argue that progress can triumph over

48. Id. at 46-47.
49. Id. at 47.
50. Id. at 19-50.
51. For more on Locke, see generally Richard Cox, Locke on War and Peace
(1960).
52. David Hume, in The Anglo-American Tradition, supranote 45, at 69.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 72-73.
55. Id. at 74-75.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 147-151.
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power when reason reforms the behavior and institutions prevalent in
international relations. The liberal progressive model of international relations
envisions a system of independent states pursuing their interests within a "legal
community of mankind. '57 A central feature of the legal community of mankind
would be the restriction and control of the use of force by states. Force would be
brought under control by legal progress, a process in which international law is
the catalyst and vehicle for constraining the use of force in international relations.
Legal progress, in turm, requires three developments: (1) a shift in thinking away
from seeing force as politically and legally proper; (2) movement towards
achieving important political conditions in the international system; and (3)
creation of needed legal mechanisms for international society. The objective of
legal progress is nothing less than a peaceful international system not menaced
by the threat or use of force.
The idea of legal progress forms a tradition because it has been endorsed by
liberals from the Enlightenment forward. Immanuel Kant, for example, believed
that "the establishment of a universal and enduring peace is not just part, but
58
rather constitutes the whole purpose of Law within the bounds of pure reason."
In the interwar years, the great British jurist Lauterpacht wrote that "[pleace is
pre-eminently a legal postulate .... .,59 And in the 1980s, one of Nicaragua's
American counsel in Nicaraguav. U.S. expressed his belief "that international
law is the best safeguard against war, destruction, and chaos."' 6 The plethora of
critics of the Reagan administration also indicate that the liberal progressive
tradition remains energetic. The critique of the Reagan administration, in
essence, is a very recent manifestation of the liberal progressive tradition.

C.

The Liberal Progressive Tradition
1. Shift from the Classical Paradigm to Legal Progress

Prior to the Enlightenment, the law of nations incorporated virtually no legal
controls on the use of force by states. In fact, because it was the legal
enforcement mechanism for the violations of existing legal rights and duties, war
played an integral part in the legal relations of states. War gave the law of
nations a legal character because it provided a mechanism for the enforcement of

57. Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 403. The term "legal community of mankind"
comes from Walter Schiffer, The Legal Community of Mankind (1954).
58. Immanuel Kant, Kant's Political Writings 257 (Hans Reiss ed., 1971).
59. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 438
(1933).

60. American Sitting Opposite U.S.-Backed Rebels, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1988, at
B6.
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the rights and duties of states created by the law of nations. 61 Hugo Grotius'
writings perhaps best illustrate this classical paradigm since in his system war
was a judicial procedure for the redress of suffered wrongs. 6 2 The most wellknown attempt to impose some orderly controls on the use of force before the
Enlightenment was the Christian Just War doctrine. 63 Ironically, the increasing

focus on the sovereignty of states in the law of nations, and hence the sovereign
right to wage war, both represented and hastened the breakdown of the older just
war conception of a larger community of Christian peoples bound by a natural
law that impinged on the resort to arms. Under the classical paradigm,
war was
64
"the actual foundation of the whole so-called international law."

During the Enlightenment, revision of the classical paradigm began; the idea
of legal progress emerged in liberal thought. 65 Three forces combined to produce
the first intellectual sparks of the liberal progressive tradition. First, liberal
thought developed as a powerful political philosophy under the influence of
Locke's and Montesquieu's writings. The notion of protecting individual rights
61. Oppenheim wrote that, "States have to take the law into their own hands. Selfhelp and intervention on the part of other States which sympathize with the wronged
one are the means by which the rules of the Law of Nations can be and actually are
enforced." Alfred Lundstedt, Superstition or Rationality in Action for Peace 172
(1925).
62. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 13 (1963).
For more on the thought of Hugo Grotius, see Hugo Grotius and International
Relations (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990).
63. Hoffmann summarizes the Christian Just War doctrine:
War would be just only if fought with the right intention by the prince
- peace and justice, not revenge - and waged for a just cause which
could be either self-defense or a cause of sufficient concern to the
community of mankind - redressing a serious injury to one's people or
one's possessions. As for the means, they were to be restricted by a
series of objective and subjective restraints. The objective restraints
were quite numerous - one was allowed to use only means which had a
reasonable chance of success, only means which were proportional to
the stakes, and there was the most important objective prescription of
noncombatant immunity. As for the subjective restraints, the most
famous is the formidable double effect rule, which said that an act of war
that was likely to have an evil effect, such as killing noncombatants,
would be morally tolerable only under two conditions: first of all, that
the direct intended effect be morally acceptable (and of course, given the
rule of proportionality, superior to the evil effect) and second, that the
evil effects be unintended, and not a means toward the end.
Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders 48 (1981).
64. Lundstedt, supra note 61, at 205.
65. Hinsley captured this change when, in analyzing Kant, he wrote: "Under the
existing law of nations states could seek their rights only by war. 'Reason . . .
condemns war as a method of finding what is right.' Thus the law of nations must be
altered." Francis H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace 68 (1967).
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through laws passed and enforced by a government chosen by and answerable to
the citizenry revolutionized political theory and, in the cases of the American
colonies and the French ancien regime, political reality. Law gained increased
prominence under liberal theory as the model for domestic politics became the
rule of law not the rule of men.
Second, the idea of progress emerged during the Enlightenment. Unlike the
cyclical view of history held by the ancients, Enlightenment thinkers posited that
human progress was possible given certain reforms of political, economic, and
social institutions. 66 Confidence in human reason increased, and the philosophes
argued that the rule of reason needed to be imposed on international relations.67
Third, dissatisfaction with the prevailing diplomacy of balance of power
politics reached new heights under the influence of seemingly endless warring and
the promise of reason applied to foreign policy. The philosophes targeted the
balance of power, which was viewed as diplomacy by passion, whims, intrigue,
and arbitrary proclivities. 6 8 Such an irrational diplomacy stood in the way of
international progress.
the old
In contemplating politics beyond the state, liberal thinkers rejected
69 Liberal
federation.
or
government
world
of
type
some
war
panacea for
thinkers, confronted by a system of sovereign states, began to devise ways to
reduce conflict between states and to provide mechanisms for the peaceful
settlement of disputes. International law figured prominently in achieving both
objectives, thus ushering in the belief in international progress towards peace
through international law.
2. Political Conditions Necessary for Legal Progress
From the Enlightenment forward, most liberal progressives realized that
controlling war would require changes in political conditions between and inside
states. It would not do, in other words, merely for states to proclaim that force
should bend its knee before international law. Legal progress demanded a
progressive milieu.
a. Interdependence
Interdependence is one of the oldest and most famous of the liberal
progressive ideas for changing the political conditions in international relations.
Through interdependence, liberal progressive thinkers hoped to reduce the sources
66. See Robert A. Nisbet, The History and Idea of Progress (1980).
67. Felix Gilbert, The "New Diplomacy" of the Eighteenth Century, 4 World Pol.

1, 10 (1951).
68. Id. at 8, 10.
69. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 116.
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of conflict between states and, thus, the likelihood of armed confrontations.
Enlightenment progressives, for example, viewed balance of power diplomacy as
destructive because it forced governments to focus on narrow conceptions of
national interest determined in military terms. The balance of power structured
state relations such that the opportunity for building common ground over a
wider spectrum of national interests was impossible. Liberal thinkers sought to
change the clash of national interests on a military level into a convergence of
interests on an economic and commercial level. Tightly intertwined economic
and commercial interests would make states interdependent, meaning that
unilateral action, particularly military action, would threaten the acting state's
own power and legitimacy.
The philosophes promoted the idea that free trade would create an
interdependent system of private and public relations that would foster
accommodation and harmonization of national interests on economic and
commercial rather than military terms. 70 Free trade would build common ground
between the peoples and the governments of states, which in turn would reduce
conflict between governments and make resort to war an increasingly unappealing
method of resolving disputes. 7 1 Kant and Jeremy Bentham joined the
philosophes in promoting free trade as a means to reduce conflict and produce
peaceful interdependence. 72 This Enlightenment initiative became
a feature of the
73
nineteenth century British and American peace movements.
The second reform designed to produce interdependence was the fashioning of
some principle of international organization with which states, could coordinate
and cooperate diplomatically in a multilateral context rather than in the
militaristic unilateralism of balance of power politics. Not all liberal thinkers
agreed that some form of international organization was needed. Many
philosophes,for example, believed that free trade would establish the community
of interests between states without the need for anything more formal. 7 4 The
feeling in the Enlightenment, however, that European states belonged to a single
75
society, a "family of nations," of a "general and unbreakable confederation" led
some liberal progressives to promote principles on which to organize this
international society other than the balance of power. The most famous liberal
70. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 82. See also Michael E. Howard, War and the Liberal
Conscience 20 (1978).
71. "In essence, liberals believe that trade and economic intercourse are a source of
peaceful relations among nations because the mutual benefits of trade and expanding
interdependence among national economies will tend to foster cooperative relations."
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations 31 (1987).
72. See Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in The Philosophy of Kant 430, 446-47
(Carl Friedrich ed., 1949) and Jeremy Bentham, in The Anglo-American Tradition,
supra nob. 45, at 182.
73. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 97. See, e.g., Richard Cobden, Free Trade as the
Best Human Means for Securing Universal and Permanent Peace (1842).
74. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 82-83.
75. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 4-5.
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progressive attempt came from Kant, who believed that a "confederation" of states
was needed to reduce war and violence between states.7 6 Kant's confederation,
however, was not a formal organization but rather was an arrangement in which
the separate states voluntarily accepted to live by a rule of law.77 In Kant's
perspective, the animating principle of international organization was
"Cosmopolitan or World Law," or, in Hinsley's words, "collaboration between
states under an improved law of nations."7 8 International society, therefore, was
to be organized not by balancing military alliances but by reference to
international law.
Kant's system, moreover, demonstrated that international law was central to
interdependence by free trade as well. Kant limited his "Cosmopolitan or World
Law" to a rule of universal hospitality that would allow citizens to trade, travel,
and develop intercourse with foreign peoples without prejudice or arbitrary
interference. Kant saw the importance of making such contacts "public and legal"
rather than leaving them outside the sphere of diplomacy and international law.7 9
The liberal progressive strategy of reducing international conflict through
interdependence represented, in essence, a strategy of legal progress. Free trade
would produce a community of interests in the private and public sphere that
could be organized and protected by international law. Disputes, therefore, would
adopt a legal rather than military nature.
b. Demilitarization
The second major political change that liberal progressives believed necessary
was demilitarization. Interdependence's goal of crafting a community of interests
between states aimed at reducing the sources of military conflict; demilitarization
supplements interdependence by reducing the threat of military power itself. The
great reform idea for demilitarizing international politics was disarmament.
Liberal progressives have long called on states to reduce the levels of their
armaments for the sake of peace.80 The disarmament strategy had two objectives.
First, disarmament widely implemented in the international system would reduce
the nervousness and tension in foreign affairs created by the presence of military
power. The liberal progressive view held that arms races were a cause of war, a
cause disarmament would address. 81 Second, disarmament would eliminate the
pernicious effects within states caused by standing armies. Most liberal thinkers
in the eighteenth century agreed with Rousseau that standing armies were

76. Kant, supra note 72, at 441.
77. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 71.
78. Francis H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System 76 (1973).
79. See Hinsley, supra note 65, at 65-66.
80. See id. at 114-49 for a discussion of the development of the idea of
disarmament in European peace movements.
81. Id. at 85.
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"dangerous establishments" because their maintenance threatened individual and
societal well-being. 8 2 Kant, for example, incorporated both of these objectives in
one of his preliminary articles for establishing perpetual peace: the gradual
reduction of standing armies as part of the peaceful confederation governed by
international law.8 The strength of opposition in the American states to
standinj armies obliged Alexander Hamilton to address "the cry raised on this
head.,,84,
As Kant realized, disarmament throughout the international system depended
upon replacing war with law as the conflict resolution mechanism. The systemic
benefits of international disarmament, therefore, would be realized only if
international law became the organizing principle of international politics instead
of the balance of power. Disarmament, then, would be a legal process both in
the setting, supervision, and fulfillment of reciprocal disarmament obligations.
c. Democratization
The third major political change that many liberal progressives believed
necessar was the democratization of diplomacy and of politics within the state.
Another reason why liberal progressives dislike the balance of power is that it
imposes on international politics a hierarchy in which great powers dictate the
terms, dynamics, and direction for the entire international system. 85 The balance
of power provides no way for medium and small states to participate in
international relations except as pawns in the stratagems of the great powers.
Liberal progressives, therefore, wanted to see international society's diplomacy
altered to allow all states to participate equally in setting and debating the
international agenda. A more democratic diplomatic structure would allow
medium and small states the chance to influence their own fate and the direction
of the system as a whole; such a structure would also erode, at least formally, the
uninhibited prerogatives of the great powers. The democratization of diplomacy
could take place within an international system organized by law, where each
state could participate in international politics on an equal footing.
Many liberals also considered it necessary for legal progress to have
democracy reign as the principle of legitimate government within states. Liberal
progressives believed that democratic republics would be peaceful because the
people, through their elected representatives, controlled the decision to go to war

82. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau on
International Relations 27 (Stanley Hoffmann and David P. Fidler eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Rousseau on International Relations].
83. Kant, supra note 72, at 432.
84. The Federalist No. 24, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
85. For a discussion of the role of the great powers in maintaining international
order, see Bull, supra note 28, at 200-09.
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as well as the power to raise and equip military forces.8 6 Establishing republican
democracies would demilitarize international and domestic politics by placing the
decision to go to war and the power of military spending in the hands
8 7 of those,
the people, who suffer the most from war and military establishments.
The significance of establishing democracy as the principle of political
legitimacy within states has profound importance for the rule of law in
international politics. First, the democratic state's aversion to armed conflict will
make legal resolution of international disputes very appealing. Second, a system
comprised of democratic states could produce such a high degree of reciprocity in
the obedience of international law that the lack of a higher sanctioning authority
ceases to be a problem. Thus, as Waltz wrote in analyzing Kant, "The 'power' to
enforce the88 law is derived not from external sanction but from internal
perfection."
3. Legal Mechanisms Necessary for Legal Progress
Liberal thinkers also believed that international legal mechanisms would be
necessary for legal progress. If international law was to become the organizing
principle of international society, then sophisticated procedures, institutions, and
rules would have to support it.
a. Mechanisms for the Legal Resolution of Conflict
Liberal progressive thinking wanted states to resolve their conflicts by law
and not by force. This desire produced three different legal means to peacefully
resolve conflicts between states.
The first means was an explicit code of international law.89 Codification of
the rules of international law was necessary for a simple reason: if states wanted
86. Again, Kant's thought is representative; in his first definitive article of his
plan for perpetual peace, Kant demands that the civil constitution of each state be
republican. Other Enlightenment liberals, like Condorcet, also adhered to this view.
Gilbert, supra note 67, at 13-15.
87. In Kant's words, "[i]f... the consent of the citizens is required in order to
decide whether there should be war or not, nothing is more natural than that those who
would have to decide to undergo all the deprivations of war will very much hesitate to
start such an evil game." Kant, supra note 72, at 438. We see this idea at work in the
United States Constitution, which vests the power to declare war and to raise armies in
the democratically-elected Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-12.
88. Kenneth Waltz, Kant, Liberalism, and War, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 331, 337
(1962).
89. If international law was to provide the basis of international relations, then
states would benefit from what Jeremy Bentham and James Mill called a rational code
of international law. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 88-89.
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to settle their disputes by law, then a code would prevent the states from differing
much about the meaning of relevant rules. The codification idea established itself
firmly in liberal thought during the nineteenth century as groups such as the
International Code Committee in the United States and the Association for the
Reform and Codification of International Law in Europe devoted their efforts to
"codifying international law so as to make it an 'organ of the world's conscience'
and an effective means of settling international disputes without recourse to
war." 90 Codification was also a major element in the thinking of American
91
international lawyers during the years preceding the First World War.
Codification of the laws of war was a topic at both the First and Second Hague
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 respectively. 9 2 The League of Nations
also sponsored codification conferences during the interwar period. 9 3 Some
international lawyers believe that article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is a codification
of the customary rule against the use or threat of force developed prior to the
Second World War.9 4 The United Nations has participated heavily in codification
as well. The General Assembly, pursuant to article 13, paragraph l(a) of the
U.N. Charter, created the International Law Commission as a subsidiary organ
charged with95 "the progressive development of international law and its
codification."
The second mechanism promoted by liberals for legally resolving state
disputes was arbitration. 96 Although modem arbitration began with the Jay
Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States,97 it did not capture
the liberal imagination until after the famous 1872 Alabama Claims arbitration
between Great Britain and the United States.9 8 Liberals expanded the precedent of
the Alabama Claims arbitration into a movement of impressive proportions. 99
90. Id. at 127.
91. Boyle, supra note 34, at 28.
92. Rules on the occupation of enemy territory, for example, were codified in
Articles 42-56 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. See Documents on the Laws of War 55-57
(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982).
93. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 31 (3d ed. 1979).
94. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 62, at 112-13.
95. U.N. Charter art. 13, l(a).
96. Arbitration is a procedure "which has for its object the settlement of
differences between States by judges of their choice and on the basis of respect for law
.... Permanent Court of International Justice in David J.Harris, Cases and Materials
on International Law 706 (3d ed. 1983).
97. Id.
98. The United States and Great Britain settled by arbitration under the Treaty of
Washington (1871) U.S. claims against Britain for damages caused to U.S. shipping
by military operations of the British-made vessel Alabama during the American Civil
War (1861-1865). See L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 714-16 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
99. In 1873, for example, two American international lawyers, J.B. Miles and
D.D. Field, traveled Europe propagating a plan for a permanent system of arbitration.
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The years preceding the First World War saw an increase in the number of
bilateral arbitration treaties, in which states agreed to submit various kinds of
disputes to arbitration. 0 0 Although interest in arbitration declined after the
arrival of international adjudication tribunals, it continues to be part of the liberal
progressive tradition not only because of its historical role but also because it
remains one of the methods of resolving interstate disputes without recourse to
force.101

The third mechanism promoted by liberals for legally resolving international
disputes was international adjudication. International adjudication differs from
arbitration in that it "presupposes the existence of a standing tribunal with its
own judges and its own rules of procedure which parties to a dispute must
accept." 102 Jeremy Bentham and James Mill were great believers in the notion of
a permanentjudicial tribunal for resolving state disputes. Bentham stated: "While
there is no common tribunal something might be said for war. Establish a
common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer follows from difference of
opinion."10° 3 There were many international lawyers during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century who believed that an international court of justice
needed to be established to compensate for the weakness of arbitration.1 ' The
revival of federal solutions to the problem of war immediately before and during
the First World War also contributed to the movement for a world court. 105 Such
a court appeared as part of the League of Nations in 1920 (the Permanent Court
of International Justice) and later as part of the United Nations in 1945 (the
International Court of Justice).
Since the idea of a world court developed directly from a desire to prevent the
use of force in international relations, many liberals believe that war and force
should be a concern of the world court's jurisprudence. We see the strength of
this belief manifested in the support and praise the ICJ received from many liberal
its willingness to handle the use of force controversies in Nicaragua
quarters10for
6
v. U.S.
Hinsley, supra note 65, at 127. Associations, like the International Arbitration and
Peace Society, the International Arbitration League, and the Inter-Parliamentary
Conference for International Arbitration, also promoted the arbitration idea in the
1880s. The Universal Peace Congresses of the 1890s devoted most of their attention
to arbitration. See id. at 126-31. The 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes set up the Permanent Court of Arbitration. On
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see Brownlie, supra note 93, at 707-08.
100. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 23.
101. In recent years, according to Brownlie, efforts have been made to revive
interest in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Brownlie, supra note 93, at 708 n.l.
102. Georg Schwarzenberger, in Harris, supra note 96, at 706.
103. Hinsley, supra note 65, at 85.
104. Boyle, supra note 34, at 18.
105. See Hinsley, supra note 65, at 140-48.
106. See, e.g., Briggs, supra note 18; Francis A. Boyle, Determining U.S.
Responsibilityfor Contra Operations Under International Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 86
(1987); Christenson, supra note 8; Richard Falk, The. World Court's Achievement, 81

64

Arizona Journal of Internationaland Comparative Law [Vol. 11, No. I

b. Mechanism for Legally Deterring and Punishing Aggression
The idea of legal progress for a long time had not included a legal sanction
that would be applied in cases of aggression. As noted earlier, the previous
sanction for violations of the law of nations had been the unilateral resort to force
by the injured state.10 7 The whole purpose of legal progress was to make such a
resort to Force unnecessary to resolve disputes touching upon important national
interests. The First World War, however, jolted liberal minds into confronting
the need for a legal sanction against aggression. That jolt produced the idea of
collective security.
The theory of collective security10 8 has two basic elements. First, the
unilateral resort to force is legally restricted. Second, a mechanism is established
that provides for the collective use of force by the international community
against a state violating international law through aggression. Security for
states, therefore, becomes the collective responsibility of the international
community. Collective security in theory seeks to deter aggression or to punish
an aggressor if aggression occurs. Collective security, further, provides
international law with a legitimate sanction utilized for the benefit of the entire
international society.
Both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the U.N. Charter
incorporate collective security mechanisms. The Covenant restricted a state's
right to resort unilaterally to force: "[s]elf-help was restricted; war was no longer
the 'litigation of Nations."' 10 9 The Covenant restricted the customary right to
resort to force by committing states (i) not to resort to war within the three
months that followed an arbitral or judicial decision; 110 (ii) not to enter war with
a state that had conformed to an arbitral or judicial decision; I I and (iii) not to
enter war with a state that had conformed to the unanimous recommendations of
the Council of the League of Nations. 112 The Covenant then provided for
collective security, albeit on a limited scale: "Should any member of the League
resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall
ipsofacto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members
Am. J. Int'l L. 106 (1987); and Tom J. Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 Am. J. Int'l
L. 112 (1987).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
108. According to Bull:
The principle of collective security implies that international order
should rest not on a balance of power, but on a preponderance of power
wielded by a combination of states acting as the agents of international
society as a whole that will deter challenges to the system or deal with
them if they occur.
Bull, supra note 28, at 239.
109. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 58.
110. League of Nations Covenant art. 12, 1 1.
111. Id. at art.. 13, 14.
112. Id at art. 15,16.
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of the League". 113 Since each member of the League undertook to preserve as
against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of
all members of the League, 1 14 article 16 committed League members to impose
obligatory economic sanctions against the aggressor and authorized the League
Council to formulate recommendations for the taking of military sanctions by the
League members against the aggressor.
The U.N. Charter similarly sets up a collective security system. Article
2(4), as noted earlier, prohibits the unilateral use or threat of force by states
except in self-defense in response to an armed attack.1 15 In the case of "any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," the Security Council has
the authority to call upon the member states to impose economic and diplomatic
sanctions116 or to take military action to maintain or restore international peace
and security 17 with military
forces made available by the member states on the
118
Security Council's request.
Collective security is an important feature of the liberal progressive tradition
because of the prominence given to it in the League Covenant and the U.N.
Charter. Since collective security developed to support legal restrictions on the
customary right to use force, it represents a major aspect of legal progress.
c. Legal Rule Prohibiting the Use of Force
The strict prohibition on the use or threat of force found in the U.N. Charter
is the last legal mechanism central to legal progress. We noted that the theory of
collective security mandated legal restrictions on a state's unilateral use of
force. 11 9 In the liberal progressive tradition, however, the importance of a legal
rule restricting a state's right to use force has value independent of the collective
security theory from which it developed. The value of the rule embodied in
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is that it rejects the classical paradigm of
international law in which the resort to force was not restricted and that it serves,
much like the Just War doctrine in medieval times, as the paramount norm
against which all uses of force are legally and morally judged.
As part of the liberal progressive tradition, the legal rule prohibiting the use
or threat of force has been interpreted in a manner consistent with the idea of legal
progress. The legal interpretation used against the United States in Nicaraguav.
U.S.and the ICJ's approval of that interpretation illustrate the liberal progressive

113. Id. at art. 16,

1.

114. Id. at art. 10.
115. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4 and art. 51. See supra text accompanying note 7.
116. Id. at art. 41.
117. Id. at art. 42.
118. Id. at art. 43.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 108-115.
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tradition's perspective on the meaning of the legal rule prohibiting the use or

threat of force.
First, international society has only one rule on the use of force. The
customary rule on the use of force, in other words, is identical to the prohibition
set out in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 120 The importance of a single rule to
legal progress is simple. The historical tolerance of customary international law
for the resort to force would contradict the prohibition in the U.N. Charter. The

two rules cannot simultaneously apply in the same legal regime. Revision of the
classical legal paradigm - the very objective of legal progress - would not be

achieved if the content of customary international law on the use of force was not
altered to reflect the prohibition in article 2(4). Customary rules could not escape
"the decisive change from a legal regime of indifference to the occasion for war
...to a legal regime which has placed substantial limitations on the competence
of states to resort to force." 12 1 Second, the single rule on the use of force is
interpreted broadly in order to place tight limits on the legal use of force. The
only permissible
use of force by states under the broad interpretation is self122
defense.
The [C approved of the broad interpretation of the rule prohibiting the use
of force in Nicaraguav. U.S. The ICJ decided that the United States breached its
obligation under customary international law not to use force against another
state in its mining of Nicaraguan harbors and its training, arming, financing, and

120. As mentioned previously, some international lawyers see article 2, 4 merely
as a codification of the customary prohibition on the use of force except for selfdefense developed during the interwar period. See Brownlie, supra note 62, at 112.
The ICJ endorsed the unity of the rule in Nicaragua v. U.S. when it held that
"customary law and the law of the Charter were essentially congruent in relevant
respects." Henkin, supra note 2, at 67 n.22.
121. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 424.
122. U.N. Charter art. 51. There is, however, something of a controversy in the
liberal progressive tradition about the use of force for humanitarian purposes, an
argument traditionally used when a state ostensibly uses force to protect nationals in
other states. Henkin, for example, writes that "the legal community has widely
accepted that the Charter does not prohibit humanitarian intervention by use of force
strictly limited to what is necessary to save lives." Henkin, supra note 2, at 41.
Akehurst, however, argues that humanitarian intervention, particularly to protect
lives of nationals abroad, is recognized as illegal by the international community.
Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Intervention in World Politics 95,
99 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984). Brownlie, likewise, argues that intervention to protect
nationals has no basis in the current law. See Brownlie, supra note 62, at 298-301
and Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations 139 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973). The practical consequences
of this disagreement are limited because those who believe that the current legal
regime supports humanitarian intervention expressly reject as illegal humanitarian
intervention that results in the overthrow of a government or the military occupation
of a state, even if these actions are necessary to fulfill humanitarian objectives.
Henkin, supra note 2, at 42.
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encouraging Contra military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua. 123 While the ICJ found that United States' support for the Contras
was aprimafacieviolation of the use of force rule, it did not find that Nicaragua's
support for the El Salvadoran rebels violated the use of force prohibition. The
ICJ, in essence, set down a threshold test for determining whether support for
insurgencies in other states violates the prohibition on the use of force.
According to the ICJ's reasoning, the Nicaraguans established that the United
States' involvement in Contra activities passed the threshold point at which
support for an insurgency becomes an illegal use of force, while the evidence of
Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador's civil war did not convince the ICJ that

Nicaragua had passed the threshold. From the liberal progressive point of view,
then, intensive financial, material, and political support for a rebel movement in
another state violates the prohibition on the use of force; but such a violation
occur if a state provides advice, arms, or economic assistance at lower
does not
124
levels.
The third aspect of the liberal progressive interpretation of the prohibition on
the use of force is the narrow reading of the right of self-defense. Under article 51
of the U.N. Charter, the use of force in self-defense is only permitted in response
to an "armed attack." 125 Under old customary international law, self-defense was
and
permissible when the "necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming,
' 126 Article 51
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.
seems to change the focus from the perceived immediacy of a threat to the
occurrence of a prior military action against a state. The question, then, becomes
not the pressing nature of a threat ("necessity") but the quality of the military
activity involved ("armed attack").
The liberal progressive tradition interprets "armed attack" restrictively. In
Nicaraguav. U.S., for example, the ICJ held that "assistance to rebels in the
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" is not an armed
attack justifying the use of force in self-defense. 127 The ICJ, therefore, rejected
the United States' claim that its Contra policy was justified as collective self-

123. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27), at In 227-38.
124. Henkin, for example, writes that "providing advice, selling arms, or giving
financial assistance to one (or both) sides in a civil war - seems not to be covered by
article 2, 1 4. ..." Henkin, supra note 2, at 47.
125. U.N. Charter art. 51. Article 51 also imposes as part of the U.N. scheme the
requirement that "[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self" Id.
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council ....
126. The Caroline Case, in Harris, supra note 96, at 656.
127. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27), 195. Nicaragua's counsel argued that
even if American allegations of Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador's civil war
were true the involvement falls far below the armed attack requirement. See Reichler &
Wippman, supra note 12, at 470.
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because Nicaragua's acts
defense with El Salvador against Nicaraguan aggression
128
did not amount to an armed attack on El Salvador.
The ICJ again utilized a threshold test. An armed attack occurs if (i) a state
sends its regular armed forces across an international border; or (ii) a state
organizes, equips, and sends armed bands into another state's territory that,
because of the scale and impact of the military activity, would be an armed attack
if undertaken by regular military forces. 12 9 Assistance for rebels in the form of
advice, arms, finances, and sanctuary, however, does not constitute an armed
attack. 130 Whether support for an insurgency is an armed attack by a state
against another, therefore, depends upon the level of control a state has on the
insurgency's military
activities and on the level of damage caused by those
13
military activities.

'

Three important consequences flow from this restrictive interpretation of
armed attack. First, the permissibility of a state's resort to self-defense depends
on objective factual tests instead of a state's subjective determination of perceived
threats to its interests. This change shifts the analysis from metaphysical
132
discourse about the "considerable relativity" in the term "necessary" to factual
questions. Brownlie argues that the difficulty of determining the facts is real but
is "a problem of mechanics which it is the task of technical experts and
international organs to solve, and which does not justify the surrender of
responsibility by jurists." 13 3 In other words, the liberal progressive regime on
the use of force and self-defense only suffers from mechanical not conceptual
difficulties.
Second, the ICJ creates a hierarchy of thresholds. The ICJ stated that
military assistance to rebels may be a use or threat of force or constitute
intervention and yet not be an armed attack. 134 Similarly, the ICJ's analysis of
support for rebels as a use of force suggests that Nicaragua's assistance to El
Salvadoran rebels amounted to intervention but not to a use of force. The
threshold hierarchy means that military support for insurgents can be (1)
intervention without being a use of force, or (2) a use of force without being an
armed attack. Different legal consequences result depending on where in the
hierarchy a particular action falls.

128. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27),
210-11.
129. Id. 1[ 187-201.
130. Id. 1 195.
131. Farer suggests that American involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion and
North Vietnamese participation in Viet Cong attacks on South Vietnam cross the
threshold drawn by the ICJ while Nicaragua's support for Salvadoran rebels does not.
Farer, supra note 106, at 113.
132. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 48.
133. Id. at 436.
134. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(Merits), 1986 LCJ. 14 (Judgment of June 27), at 1 195.
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Third, the hierarchy crafted by the ICJ does not fully clarify what responses
by a state and its allies are legal in the cases of (1) a use of force that is not an
13 5
As Henkin
armed attack; and (2) an intervention that is not a use of force.
notes, "the [ICJ] did not address the victim's right of armed response to less than
an armed attack,' or what means other than force can be used in response to such
interventions by either the victim or its friends .... -136 The ICJ stated that a
state facing action amounting to less than an armed attack could take "forcible
countermeasures," 137 but did not clarify what was meant by this concept. It did,
however, explicitly prohibit collective countermeasures by a victim state and its
8
allies in response to action not amounting to an armed attack. 13 An ally may
provide military support to a government facing an insurgency movement, but
the ally cannot take action, directly or indirectly, against those states assisting the
insurgency as long as the assistance does not amount to an armed attack.
It is not clear, however, what countermeasures the victim state can take
directly against states whose support of insurgents does not constitute an armed
attack. Farer suggests that, for example, El Salvador "is justified in providing
arms to the Contras, unless Nicaragua has ceased aiding its rebels or it appears
reasonably likely that an end to such assistance could be achieved through
negotiations." 139 Farer's suggestion implies that the threshold hierarchy creates a
proportional response hierarchy. An armed attack, therefore, can legally be met
by a proportionate armed counterattack. Uses of force must be answered by
proportionate uses of force; victim states can legally respond to interventions
with proportionate counterintervention. Only in the case of an armed attack,
however, can collective measures be taken by a victim state and its allies. The
hierarchy of proportionate responses, thus, flows logically from the hierarchy of
thresholds present in the liberal progressive position.

135. Responses to armed attacks are legal if they are proportionate to the threat
posed by the attack. See The Caroline Case, in Harris, supra note 96, at 655-56.
Nicaragua's counsel argued that even if Nicaragua's support for Salvadoran rebels
constituted an armed attack the Reagan administration's "creation of a 15,000-man
mercenary army that regularly launches attacks against economic and civilian targets
deep within Nicaragua - for the purpose of removing the Nicaraguan government cannot be considered a proportionate response to purported arms shipments to El
Salvador under any definition of the word 'proportionate."' Reichler & Wippman,
supra note 12, at 471.
136. Henkin, supra note 2, at 49.
137. Scheffer, supra note 4, at 9.
138. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
210-11.
(Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27),
139. Farer, supra note 106, at 113.
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D.

Surnmary of the Liberal Progressive Tradition

Since the dominant critique of the Reagan administration's handling of the
international law on the use of force represents a recent expression of the liberal
progressive tradition, I have presented the fundamental elements of that tradition
to show where the Reagan administration's critics are coming from and to provide
a set of criteria with which to evaluate the conventional critique of the Reagan
administration. The concepts in the liberal progressive tradition and the Reagan
administration's critics' handling of the concepts will be central to the remaining
analysis.
As we have seen, the liberal progressive tradition is a rich historical
collection of liberal thought on international politics. The animating objective
of the tradition is legal progress - the attempt to control the use of force in
international politics through international law. Liberals have variously written
about both the political conditions and legal mechanisms needed to achieve legal
progress. Interdependence, demilitarization, and democratization represent the
political requirements for establishing the rule of law in international politics.
Codification, arbitration, adjudication, collective security, and the strict rules
prohibiting the use of force and restricting the exercise of self-defense have
historically been the requisite legal mechanisms for legal progress. How well the
liberal progressive tradition fares in the hands of the Reagan administration's
critics when it is confronted by another tradition of liberal thought on
international law is the question this article addresses next.

Ill.

A.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S PERSPECTIVE AND
THE LIBERAL REALIST TRADITION

Relism and Liberal Realism

According to its critics, the Reagan administration's violation of the
prohibition on the use of force and its abandonment of the American tradition of
fostering international law represent the offspring of "realism." 140 The Reagan
administration's critics use the realist charge to suggest that the administration
rejected liberal values and concerns in order to play power politics. Much of the
international legal literature critical of the Reagan administration implies that
legal progress is the only credible and worthy tradition of liberal thought on

140. See supra text accompanying notes 27-38.
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international politics. "Peace
through law," as Shklar points out, "is a cherished
14 1
aspect of liberal ideology."
The starting point for understanding the Reagan administration's perspective
is realizing that the liberal progressive tradition does not constitute liberal
thoughts only, or even its most credible, response to the problem of war and
force in international politics. The clash of legal progress and power-thirsty
realism repeatedly used in the literature critical of the Reagan administration
makes for fine rhetoric, but it is not a sophisticated analysis of the Reagan
administration's perspective or of liberal thought's inherent difficulties in dealing
with international law and politics. The simplistic approach of the conventional
critique of the Reagan administration can be seen, when liberal thought's
fundamental dilemma in international relations and its responses to that dilemma
are analyzed.
This fundamental dilemma can be simply stated: part of the liberal solution
to protecting individual freedom from oppression and freedom to participate in
self-government is a properly constructed state; but the existence of separate
states that answer to no higher authority creates an international system filled
with insecurity, competition, and violence. 142 The liberal answer for domestic
politics is the nightmare for international politics. 143 Liberal thought, therefore,
confronted the dilemma of finding a way to ameliorate the mistrust, friction, and
conflict between states without eliminating the state, which was the very source
of the international problem.
Liberal thought's task was all the more complicated because the domestic and
international realms offered thinkers different political and moral dynamics. As
Hoffnann points out, domestically "[tihe essence of liberalism is self-restraint,
moderation, compromise, and peace ....[while] [t]he essence of international
" 144
politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace, at best, or the state of war.
Domestic politics offers more room for moral opportunity than the harsher

141. Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials 129 (2d ed.

1986).
142. According to Waltz,
[t]his is the culminating problem of Kant's philosophy. Men need the
protection of law before they have any chance of leading the moral life
to which their reason commands them. The civil state is not sufficient.
Peace among, as well as within, states is essential to the development
of uniquely human capacities .... The constant hostility of states and
the pressures of recurring war make its fulfillment impossible. How can
the problem be solved?
Waltz, supra note 88, at 334.
143. Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 397.
144. Id. at 396.
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145 In short, the "international
dynamics of international politics.146
milieu is, by
nature, inhospitable to liberalism."
This fundamental dilemma provoked four responses from liberals.
Liberalism and the liberal progressive tradition represent two of these responses.
At the other extreme from legal progress was a third response: realism. The
fourth response, liberal realism, falls in between legal progress and realism on the
spectrum of liberal responses. The difference between realism and liberal realism,
particularly in relation to international law, is central to this article's analysis.

1_lalasm
Some liberals have examined the dilemma posed by international politics
without devising a way for states to escape the brutal competition of international
politics. Rousseau, for example, could offer states no better advice than to be
small, wealk, poor, and 'isolated so that no power would have any interest in
quarrelling with such a state. 147 Rousseau considered but rejected the solutions
of free trade (interdependence), international law, and international federation as
either inadequate or impossible for taming the state of war. 14 8 Although
' 149
Rousseau viewed war as morally unacceptable, he became a "reluctant realist
because he saw no escape for states from the insecurity, inequality, tension, and
violence inherent in international politics. Rousseau compared the fate of nations
to "the trnquillity of Ulysses' comrades, shut 150
in the cave of the Cyclops, waiting
to be eaten. One must groan and keep silent."
Realism, properly considered, offers states a future filled with either war or
fragile truces grounded precariously on reciprocity produced by fear. As Reinhold
Niebuhr wrote, under realism "an uneasy balance of power would seem to become
the highest goal to which society could aspire." 15 I More specifically, realism
holds that international law is nothing more than an ineffective moral code
145. Wolfers argues that the greater degree of moral opportunity in domestic
politics partially explains the historical Anglo-American theoretical neglect of
international politics. Arnold Wolfers, Political Theory and InternationalRelations,
in The Anglo-American Tradition, supra note 45, at xv.
146. Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 405.
147. See Introduction, in Rousseau on International Relations, supra note 82, at
lxiv-lxv.
148. Id.
149. Christine Carter, Rousseau and the Problem of War 205 (1987).
150. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The State of War, in Rousseau on International
Relations, supra note 82, at 43. Although Rousseau was deeply attached to liberal
principles, his conclusions on international politics matched those of the classical
realists writers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. See Thucydides, The
History of the Peloponnesian War (Rex Warner trans., 1954); Niccolo Machiavelli,
The Prince and Discourses (Max Lerner ed., 1950) (1513); and Hobbes, supra note 27.
151. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society 232 (1932).
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because its rules cannot be enforced by or derived from a central source of
authority. 152 Further, as Rousseau argued, international law becomes merely
another instrument to gain advantages in the state of war.1 53 The morality of
54
international law, therefore, is skewed for the benefit of the powerful)
According to realism, even the substance of the moral code laid out in
international law bears the brutal imprint of the state of war. Far from
representing a solution, international law, in Rousseau's imagery, is just another
captive in the Cyclops' cave.
2. Liberal Realism
Liberals analyzing international politics rarely embrace realism as Rousseau
reluctantly did. Liberal politics and pure realism are incompatible. Realism's
tragic cycle of international violence directly threatens liberal principles such that
liberals have to alter international political dynamics or individual freedom within
the state will face grave peril. Both Rousseau and Kant recognized that the state
of war characterizing international politics threatened individual liberty by (i) the
ever-present possibility of war; and (ii) the measures taken by the state to prepare
for and carry out military security. 155 Thus, the establishment of a liberal state
cannot guarantee the rights of the citizens as long as the state of war between
nations continues unaltered. 156 Individual liberty has an immediate concern with
international peace. Rousseau's despair, therefore, is exceptional in liberal
thought. Most liberals, following Kant, believe that not only must something

152. "As for what iscommonly called international law, because its laws lack any
sanction, they are unquestionably mere illusions, even feebler than the law of nature."
Rousseau, supra note 150, at 44.
153. Id.
154. "Justice and truth must be bent to serve the most powerful: that isthe rule."
Id. at43.
155. See Rousseau, supra note 150; Rousseau, supra note 82, at 27; Waltz, supra
note 88, at 336; and Introduction,supra note 147, at lxvii.
156. Hoffmann writes that liberals reject the realist message:
partly because of the centrality of war in the realists' vision of
international affairs and the centrality of revulsion against war in that
of the liberals; partly because of the implications of a 'state of war'
abroad for domestic society (civil war, or the Prince's tyranny justified
by the primacy of foreign policy); partly because of the liberals'
concern for individual self-fulfillment, and their sense that this could
only be made possible through some breach in the citadel of the state,
some measure of cosmopolitanism.
Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 401.
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be done but also that liberals have a duty to attempt changes in international
politics if liberal principles really do have meaning. 157
According to most liberals, then, "pure realism can offer nothing more but a
naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society
impossible." 158 The debate between liberals, therefore, does not concern the
sterility of pure realism. Liberals divide over what international improvements
can be made, how improvements can be made, and how much improvement is
really possible. The answers to these questions are what distinguish the liberal
realist from the liberal progressive tradition.
The critics of the Reagan administration mistake liberal realism for pure, or
classical, realism. The Reagan administration adopted many of the precepts of
the "American realist" thinkers, who have dominated the theoretical and practical
landscape of international politics in the United States since the end of the Second
World War. Post-war realism in the United States and Western Europe differed
from classical realism in a crucial respect. Hoffmann explains:
But what is striking today is

. .

.that many of the "realists"

-

especially Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron either smuggled in or openly injected liberal values and goals whenever
they went, beyond empirical analysis, into their own attempt at
showing how the jungle could be made livable, how the "right"
understanding
of the game could make its inevitable perpetuation
159
tolerable.
A perspective in which empirical realism commingles with liberal values and
goals represents a far different concoction than classical realism. While the

157. "The statesman's difficulty is that he must play the game of international
competition, from which he can escape only exceptionally, and at the same time he
ought not to lost sight of Kant's ideal. He ought not to give up the hope of a future
world community, but he cannot act as if it already existed." Introduction,supra note
147, at lxxi.
158. Carr, supra note 27, at 93. Niebuhr agrees: A too consistent political realism
would seem to consign society to perpetual warfare." Niebuhr, supra note 151, at 231.
Carr, in fact, argued further that
[t]he impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is
one of the most certain and most curious lessons of political science
.... Every realist... is ultimately compelled to believe not only that
there is something which man ought to think and do, but that there is
something which he can think and do, and that his thought and action
are neither mechanical nor meaningless.
Carr, supra note 27, at 89, 93.
159. Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 384. Shklar similarly observes: "American
realists today are, however, anything but fascists in the making. They are, in fact,
despairing liberals." Shklar, supra note 141, at 125.
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classical realist offers "a naked struggle for power," the liberal realist tries "to find
ways of instilling as many liberal concerns and ideas as possible into a game that
... cannot be wished away but that, if played as in the past, risks leading us all
to destruction and chaos." 160

B.

Liberal Realism. International Law & International Politics

1. Liberal Realism. the Reagan Administration. and International Law
The belief that the use of force in international politics could be controlled
through international law characterizes the liberal progressive tradition. Liberal
realism rejects (1) the notion that international politics will ever function without
the threat or-use of force; and (2) the idea that international law can control, let
alone, outlaw force. Liberal realism, in short, holds that international law can
make no significant contribution to the liberal effort to control force in
international politics.
Liberal realism, however, unlike classical realism, does not deny that
international law exists. Realism insists that rules be enforceable by a common
authority before they can be called "law." Liberal realism takes a different
approach: reciprocity serves as an alternative source for legitimately providing
rules with a legal status. In realism, reciprocity represents merely the temporary
and fragile convergence of interests that international political competition
threatens to shatter at any moment, and, thus, cannot confer on rules any "legal"
significance. Liberal realism, however, contends that mutually respected and
obeyed rules between states develop into practices and expectations that gradually
16 1
solidify into more than the ephemeral convergence of selfish interests.
Common interests, through reciprocity, can become common values represented
in rules of international law. Reciprocity can produce amongst states a sense that
they are bound by the rules both for self-interest and for the good of the
international society. Liberal realism, therefore, does not completely reject
international law as an instrument for injecting liberal values and interests into
international politics.
Liberal realism recognizes, however, that international law's potential
contribution to controlling the use of force is very limited unless international
political conditions change significantly so that reciprocity will be effective when
vital national interests are at stake. Thus, the potential for reciprocity decreases

160. Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 395.
161. Gottlieb argues that "reciprocity lies at the very foundation of international
law itself. In the international arena, reciprocity is the true guarantor of obligations
.. " Gidon Gottlieb, How to Rescue International Law, Commentary, October 1984,

at 46, 50.
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in inverse proportion to the importance of the national interest at stake. Since no
national interest is more important than self-preservation and national security,
reciprocity will be at its weakest when use of force situations are involved. 162 If
international political conditions are such that threats to national security are
minimized or contained,163then reciprocity may have more potential to transform
mere interests into law.
In the liberal realist perspective, the prohibition on the use of force central to
the liberal progressive tradition loses much of its legal and moral significance
because of the lack of reciprocity. 164 The Reagan administration shared this
perspective when it focused on the lack of reciprocity in the international system.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick expressed the Reagan administration's view on
reciprocity:
But we cannot permit

. . .

ourselves to feel bound to unilateral

compliance with obligations which do in fact exist under the Charter,
but are renounced by others. This is not what the rule of law is all
about. As we confront the clear and present dangers in the contemporary
world, we must recognize that the belief that the U.N. Charter's
principles of individual and collective
self-defense require less than
165
reciprocity - is simply not tenable.
In concentrating on reciprocity, the Reagan administration turned the
spotlight away from transparent rhetoric to international reality. What the new
focus revealed and the Reagan administration publicly challenged was the attitude
and practice of the Soviet Union and its allies. The Reagan administration forced
people to confront the obvious. 166 Soviet bloc policy represented a complete

162. As Rogers notes, "states facing crises that touch on their national interest
and security have not been inclined to ask whether a contemplated use of force is legal
and pay much attention to the answers." William Rogers, The Principles of Force, The
Force of Principles,in Right v. Might, supra note 2, at 103-04.
163. ":Put simply," writes Turner, "an essential condition of effective international
law is reciprocity." Turner, supra note 29, at 129.
164. Turner argues that international law "has failed in its effort to eliminate armed
conflict for two key reasons: (1) not all states voluntarily accept its underlying
principles; and (2) the international legal system currently lacks reciprocity." Turner,
supra note 39, at 169.
165. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Law and Reciprocity, 78 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 59, 6768 (1984).
166. Eugene Rostow writes, "The Soviet Union has taken the position that Article
2(4) does not apply to it, and it has committed acts of aggression in violation of
Article 2(4) hundreds if not thousands of times." Eugene V. Rostow, The Legality of
the International Use of Force by and from States, 10 Yale J.Int'l L. 286, 287-88
(1985). Higgins notes that the Soviets have contended that (1) the use of force rules
of international law do not apply to its relations with its communist allies, which are
governed by socialist international legal principles; and (2) it can legitimately
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repudiation of the fundamental norm of the international system. In the Soviet
bloc perspective, the only time the prohibition on the use of force was effective
was in relation to capitalist countries' relations with socialist states. The Soviet
bloc position was audacious and unbelievable: the prohibition against the use of
force does not affect Soviet bloc policies towards its satellites or enemies, but the
prohibition does bind its enemies' policies towards it.167
The Reagan administration perceived the continuation of this attitude towards
the use of force in Nicaragua's policies. 16 8 As soon as the Sandinistas
consolidated power in 1979, Cuban military advisors and Soviet military
equipment began to flow into Nicaragua. The first major foreign policy action
taken by the Sandinistas was to help communist guerrillas in El Salvador launch
a "final offensive" against the El Salvadoran government. The same pattern the
end of the Second
United States had seen in other parts of the world since the169
World War appeared to be repeating itself in Central America.
Turner argues that one of the major reasons the Reagan administration
withdrew from Nicaraguav. U.S. is that the administration believed "that the lack
of international reciprocity made the court... an inappropriate forum for the
dispute." 170 In other words, an ICJ ruling would have made no impact on states
already contemptuous of international law. In fact, the Sandinistas continued to

support military activity around the world in the name of national liberation from
imperialist forces. Rosalyn Higgins, Contending Systems of World Public Order and
InternationalLaw: An Overview, 25 Atlantic Community Q. 145, 154 (1987). See
also W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in InternationalLaw,
10 Yale J.Int'l L. 279, 280 (1985).
167. Ambassador Kirkpatrick comments:
This dual conception of international law accords to the Soviet Union,
then, and to its friends, absolute right and minimal obligations to
respect the rights of others while it accords to other states no rights
against indirect aggression but an absolute obligation to respect the
rights of the Soviet Union and its friends.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 165, at 61.
168. See id.
169. Nicholas Rostow writes:
The real attitude of the Nicaraguan government with regard to
international law governing the use of force and self-defense mirrors
that espoused in Havana and Moscow. Like Cuba and the Soviet Union,
Nicaragua acts on the view that international law permits the support of
insurrections in other states against governments it can label
'imperialist,' 'bourgeois,' 'fascist,' and the like, and that the United
States may not help such states defend themselves.
Nicholas Rostow, Nicaragua: A Surreply to a Rejoinder, 11 Yale J.Int'l L. 474, 478

(1986).
170. Turner, supra note 39, at 170.
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send arms to El Salvadoran guerrillas even after the ICJ ruling in Nicaraguav.
1

U.S. 17

The standard reply to the liberal realist emphasis on reciprocity concerning
the rules on the use of force is that the principle of reciprocity should not control
the United States' attitude towards those rules: "The fact that the Soviet Union

often fails to adhere to these rules does not necessarily justify abandoning
them." 172 The liberal realist critique of this unilateral compliance argument is
threefold. First, if the rule only has unilateral force, then it no longer has any
legal significance but becomes a self-imposed moral obligation. As noted earlier,
reciprocity is fundamental to international law. 173 Rules recognized to be devoid
of reciprocity cannot be held to be binding legal obligations. Liberal
progressives who argue for unilateral compliance can only make moral arguments
for compliance.
Second, state practice changes rules of international law. The liberal realist
position is that both the conventional and customary strands of the prohibition

on the use of force have been altered by state practice.17 4 The liberal progressive
tradition, however, tries to maintain exactly the opposite position, as evidenced
by the ICJ's legal interpretations in Nicaragua v. U.S. In relation to the
conventional strand of the prohibition on the use of force, article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, the liberal realist position is that the failure of the U.N. Charter
collective security system diminishes the significance of article 2(4).
Ambassador Kirkpatrick argued that article 2(4):

171. On October 18, 1989, a Honduran border patrol captured a van heading for El
Salvador in which they found Soviet AK-47 and American M-16 rifles with
ammunition. The van driver "said he had loaded the van with furniture in Costa Rica,
and then made a stop-over in Nicaragua." The Battle for El Salvador,The Economist,
Nov. 18, 1989, at 45. The Sandinistas, according to The Economist, "denied having
sent fresh weapons to its Salvadoran friends; [but) other reports suggest otherwise."
Id. On November 26, 1989, a plane registered in Nicaragua crashed in El Salvador. On
board, El Salvadoran officials discovered 24 Soviet made SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles,
one American made Redeye antiaircraft missile, a 75 millimeter antitank cannon with
21 projectiles, and other military equipment. Documents found in the plane and on the
bodies of the dead pilots linked them to Nicaragua. According to diplomats and
Salvadoran government officials, this arms shipment "would have far greater
implications for regional politics because it indicated that Nicaragua was supplying
the rebels with advanced weapons that they have never used before in battle." Lindsey
Gruson, Plane in Salvador with Soviet Arms Crashes and 4 Die: Link to Nicaragua
Seen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, § 1, at 1. See also Georges A. Fauriol, The Shadow
of Latin American Affairs, 69 Foreign Aff. (No. 1) 116, 127 (1990).
172. Scheffer, supra note 4, at 7-8.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 161-163.
174. See Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 Am. J.
Int'l L. 101 (1987) and Alberto R. Coll, The Limits of Global Consciousness and
Legal Absolutism: Protecting International Law from Some of Its Best Friends, 27
Harv. Int'l L.J. 599, 620 (1986).
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was never intended to stand on its own, but was to be seen in the
context of the entire Charter.... The structure of the U.N. Charter was
accepted by its member states on the expectation of the member states
that is,
of the effective functioning of collective peacekeeping measures;
175
states would cooperate in the maintenance of world peace.
Since the U.N. collective security system never worked, article 2(4) could not
carry the sane weight as it had in the vision of the Charter's framers. When
collective security failed, the inherent right of self-defense contained in article 51
took on a broader significance and increased in importance in the liberal realist
perspective because national and regional security had to be provided by
traditional means of self-help and military alliances.
The rule advocated in the liberal progressive tradition ignores the failure of
one of its own legal mechanisms: collective security. 176 As seen in Nicaraguav.
U.S., liberal progressives argued for a broad interpretation of article 2(4) and a
narrow reading of article 51. How such a construction can be rendered in light of
the complete failure of the U.N. collective security system at the time is not
addressed by the liberal progressives, revealing their distaste for legal analysis
within political context. Liberal progressives seem content to appeal to article
2(4) as if it enjoyed some type of super-legal status above and beyond the
Charter's structure. Liberal realism, as evidenced by the Reagan administration's
actions, does not divorce article 2(4) from the rest of the Charter principles in
such an arbitrary fashion. Instead, article 2(4) was not placed in the Charter as a
Kantian categorical imperative but as one of the rules in a collective security
system. 177 The failure of that system negatively impacts upon the significance
of article 2(4).
In relation to the customary strand of the prohibition against the use of force,
the liberal realist position is that state practice since 1945 has changed the
customary rule on the use of force. 17 8 The ICJ in Nicaraguav. U.S., however,
found customary international law to be identical to article 2(4) "without any
17 9
reference whatsoever to the ways in which governments actually behave."
The ICJ's method of interpreting customary law struck many commentators as
fundamentally misguided. Franck, for example, writes:
175. Kirkpatrick, supra note 165, at 60.
176. Coll wrote that "the hope that the United Nations can control the use of force
in international relations and provide even a degree of collective security in cases
involving the most blatant aggression is dead and beyond revival." Coil, supra note
174, at 609. While the end of the Cold War and the United Nations operation during
the Gulf War have revived hopes in collective security, such hopes have, however,
received fresh abuse in the form of the catastrophe in the former Yugoslavia.
177. Coil, for example, observes that article 2(4) must relate to the U.N. collective
security system. Id.
178. See sources cited supra note 174.

179. Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 146, 147
(1987).
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Traditionally, a normative principle has been thought to enter into
customary law only after being confirmed by practice, that is, after it is
demonstrably adhered to by the actual conduct of the large preponderance
of international actors capable of violating it. The customary norms
cited by the Court are adhered to, at best, only by some states, in some
instances, and have been ignored, alas, with impunity in at least two
hundxed instances of military conflict since the end of World War II.180
Even the ICJ conceded that violations of the customary rule against the use of
force are not infrequent; yet it refused to allow state practice to affect the
customary rule. As Franck and Kirgis point out, the lCJ based its finding on
customary law on opinio juris primarily in the form of U.N. General Assembly
resolutions and declarations. 18 1 D'Amato attacks the ICJ's approach:
The Court

. .

.completely misunderstands customary law. First, a

customary rule arises out of state practice; it is not necessarily to be
found in U.N. resolutions and other majoritarian documents. Second,
opinio juris has nothing to do with 'acceptance' of rules in such
documents.... [The ICJ] purports to give us a rule of customary
international law without even considering the practice of states and
without giving
any independent, ascertainable meaning to the concept of
182
opiniojuris.
The liberal realist position is that state practice still drives customary
international law, meaning that the customary law on the use of force cannot be
identical to article 2(4) because of state practice. The practical effect of this fact
to the liberal realist is that the customary right to use force in self-defense
becomes broaderinstead of narrower. The rigid, mechanical rule central to the
liberal progressive tradition, in short, does not survive the impact of state
practice.
The third liberal realist response to the unilateral compliance argument is
that the failure of the U.N. collective security system and the impact of state
practice on customary international law erodes much of the significance of the
prohibition against the use of force.18 3 Coll gives a good description of the
liberal realist perspective on what is left: "The obligation embodied in article
2(4) has not been completely destroyed, but it has been altered substantially so

180. Thomas Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ's Proceduraland Substantive
Innovations, 81 Am. J.Int'l L. 116, 119 (1987).
181. Id. at 118-19; Kirgis, supra note 179, at 147. Another scholar takes issue
with the ICJ's handling of two key resolutions. See Fred L. Morrison, Legal Issues in
the Nicaragua Opinion, 81 Am. J. Intl L. 160 (1987).
182. D'Amato, supra note 174, at 103-04.
183. See id. at 105.
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its core value - the prohibition of clearaggression- remains
that at most only
authoritative." 184
Hargrove sounds a similar message when he writes:
The essence of the Charter principles is that... a state must refrain
from using force against other states, except where force is being used
against it. In that case, it is free to defend itself with force as best it
can, provided only that its response is reasonably proportionate to the
inJurr being forcibly inflicted and, in fact, necessary to put an end to
The liberal realist perspective favors a more practical, meaningful emphasis on
illegal uses of force rather than the liberal progressive effort to distinguish the
legal significance between an intervention not amounting to a use of force, a use
of force not amounting to an armed attack, and an armed attack. The broader,
flexible concept of the illegal use of force represents a more manageable legal
framework. As Hargrove argues, the framework used must "be readily
perceivable, by people bearing the actual responsibilities of government, to
reflect the practical requirements of the world in which states must survive and
conduct their affairs.... [It] cannot be full of arcane
186 technicalities or arbitrary
distinctions requiring continuous expert exegesis."
The Reagan administration's legal position on its policy towards Nicaragua
embodies the liberal realist framework. The administration considered Sandinista
support for the communist insurgency in El Salvador to be an illegal, aggressive
use of force to which El Salvador and the United States could respond in
collective self-defense. 187 As indicated in the Reagan administration's position,
the liberal realist focus was not on legalistic distinctions but on the hostile,
violent, and destabilizing behavior of the Sandinista regime. Even one of the
fiercest critics of the Reagan administration's attitude towards international law,
Senator Moynihan, admitted that "[g]iven the behavior of the Nicaraguan

184. Coil, supra note 174, at 608. Eugene Rostow also writes that "it is
impossible to determine whether article 2(4) of the Charter is an operative legal norm.

On the other hand, it has not yet disappeared as an influence on state behavior or as an
aspiration for international law." Rostow, supra note 166, at 290.
185. John L. Hargrove, The NicaraguaJudgment and the Future of the Law of Force
and Self-Defense, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 135, 136 (1987).
186. Id. at 137.
187. According to Abraham Sofaer, the Reagan administration decided "that
Nicaragua's support of guerrillas for the purpose of destroying the government of El
Salvador" was illegal "and that necessary and proportionate responses, including
force, could be taken collectively against such actions." Abraham D. Sofaer,
InternationalLaw and the Use of Force, Nat'l Interest, Fall 1988, at 53, 58.
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government toward
at least one of its neighbors, there is, I believe, a right of
188
action there."

The liberal realist framework corrects another glaring defect in the liberal
progressive perspective. The ICJ's distinctions between intervention, use of
force, and armed attack invite aggressive regimes to destabilize other governments
by means not amounting to an armed attack because the victimized state cannot
legally exercise its right of individual or collective self-defense. 189 Under the
liberal progressive rule, a state that falls victim to an intervention or use of force
not constituting an armed attack cannot respond with either individual or
collective self-defense. The victim state190can only take proportional
"countermeasures" within its own borders.
A number of unacceptable
consequences flow from the liberal progressive view.
First, the liberal progressive view as articulated by the ICJ in Nicaraguav.
U.S. gives "radical regimes in the contemporary world legal sanction for their
policies of covert warfare....,, 19 1 For example, a state supporting a guerrilla
movement in another state does not have to fear military action against itself,
meaning that "[s]ource states get a free ride, legally invulnerable to individual or
collective response against their own territory, even if the insurgency is planned,
trained, armed and directed from there." 192 Note how closely the liberal
progressive position parallels the Soviet concept of international law: socialist
states can encourage and support national liberation struggles but bourgeois states
cannot use force against socialist countries. As Nicholas Rostow argued,
"Nicaraguan support for guerrillas in neighboring states constitutes a unilateral
attempt to impose change by the use of force on the ground that a Socialist
government has the right under international law to propagate its principles by
the sword." 19 3 The liberal progressive rule contains nothing to deter states from
engaging in covert war against other states.
Second, the liberal progressive view requires states to accept that their
inherent right of self-defense is not triggered by a foreign state encouraging,
fomenting, and supplying revolutionary forces inside its borders. The ICJ
essentially declared that only "armed attacks" narrowly defined threaten the
territorial integrity and political independence of a state. In the mechanical liberal
progressive scheme, the fundamental right of self-defense becomes contingent on
how legal experts assess the violent threat. And, as we noted earlier, liberal
188. Moynihan, supra note 12, at 65.
189. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27), 1 177 (Schwebel, J., dissent),
and Hargrove, supra note 185, at 141-42.
190. Franck, supra note 180, at 120. See also Sofaer, supra note 187, at 58.
191. Coll, supra note 174, at 611. See also Rostow, supra note 169, at 474 and
John N. Moore, The NicaraguaCase and the Deteriorationof World Order, 81 Am. J.
Int'l L. 151, 155 (1987).
192. Franck, supra note 180, at 120.
193. Nicholas V. Rostow, Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited, 11
Yale J. Int'l L. 437, 458 (1986).
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progressives viewed this assessment as "a problem of mechanics which it is the
task of technical experts and international organs to solve ... -*194

The

cumulative result of the liberal progressive position becomes the following: a
state cannot act in self-defense unless legal experts and international organs deem
the existence of an "armed attack" in the narrow sense even though neither the
experts nor organs have been able to solve the failure of collective security, the
lack of reciprocity in the law, and the dangerous threat of covert aggression.
The liberal realist response to these problems in the liberal progressive
tradition is twofold. First, liberal realism has always considered violent threats
amounting to less than a cross-border invasion as triggering the right of selfdefense. The contemporary liberal realist position does not embrace the robust
right of anticipatory self-defense as it existed in Hamilton's day, 19 5 but it
certainly considers indirect aggression sufficient to trigger the right of selfdefense. Secretary of State Dulles stated in 1958 that "[w]e do not think that the
words 'armed attack' preclude treating as such an armed revolution which is
fomented from abroad, aided and assisted from abroad." 196 Liberal realism, in
essence, views all illegal uses of force as aggressive armed attacks activating the
right to self-defense. 197 Oddly enough, the U.N. General Assembly Declaration
on Friendly Relations and the Definition of Aggression support the liberal realist
argument that "aggression includes both direct and indirect complicity in all
forms of violence, not just conventional hostilities." 198 The liberal realist
perspective does not create legal loopholes through which violent means escape
the deterrence of self-defense; if a state intends to use force aggressively either
directly or indirectly, then its actions will trigger the victim state's right of
individual and collective self-defense.

194. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 436.
195. Hamilton wrote that there was "no rule of public law better established, or on
better grounds, than that when one nation unequivocally avows maxims of conduct
dangerous to the security and tranquility of others, they have a right to attack her and
to endeavor to disable her from carrying her schemes into effect." Alexander
Hamilton, in The Anglo-American Tradition, supra note 45, at 146. See also David
Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of
Power 101 (1985).
196. Sofaer, supra note 187, at 55. See also Turner, supra note 39, at 164.
197. Sofaer, supra note 187, at 54.
198. Id. See Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among. States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883rd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8082
(1970) and Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
2319th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8890 (1974). Eugene Rostow further notes that the
international system has since 1945 considered support for insurgency groups to be
use of force, aggression, and armed attack. Rostow, supra note 40, at 282.
Interestingly, Turner points out that the equally authoritative French text of the U.N.
Charter article 51 uses the term aggression armee, or "armed aggression," rather than
"armed attack." Turner, supra note 29, at 134 n.6.
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Second, liberal realism recognizes that, absent collective security and
reciprocity, the right of self-defense cannot be subordinated to formalistic legal
rules. As Sofaer argued: "But the right to self-defense is too fundamental for
leaders to allow it to be subordinated to any scheme of world order based on
theory and wishful thinking, however enlightened." 19 9 Sofaer believes that the
Reagan administration properly withdrew from Nicaragua v. U.S. because "the
President had decided this nation could not allow its right to exercise self-defense
to be regulated by the ICJ without its consent."'2°° The logical effect of narrowly
interpreting the right of self-defense as liberal progressives do
is to require a commander in chief confronted by unlawful force, in order
to determine whether or how defensive force may be used, to consult
lists reflecting the [ICJ's] finely calibrated expert judgment as to what
classes of acts are a priorimilitarily significant, or to call in the Court
for such military advice on the spot.20 1
Such a consultation would prove futile to self-defense anyway since "impossible
standards of proof have been set to determine when an armed attack that triggers
the right to self-defense has actually occurred." 20 2 The ICJ, for example, seems
to require evidence against interest before it will activate its legal rules.2 03 As
many have pointed out, .no responsible leader facing
the reality of international
2°4
politics can accept the liberal progressive regime.
Liberal realism restores to the state the vitality of its right of self-defense. It
allows a state victimized by an illegal use of force to respond with proportional
force. 20 5 Thus, the liberal realist perspective on proportionality differs from the
artificial hierarchy of proportionate responses found in the liberal progressive
tradition. Under the hierarchy of proportionate responses, if an aggressor state
supports an insurgency within another state, the top range of the victim state's
legitimate proportional response is to support an insurgency in the aggressor
state. What if the aggressor state is free from rebellious elements? Can the

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
Franck,
205.

Sofaer, supra note 187, at 61.
Id. at 62.
Hargrove, supra note 185, at 139.
Gottlieb, supra note 161, at 47.
See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
See Hargrove, supra note 185, at 139; Sofaer, supra note 187, at 59-60; and
supra note 180, at 121.
Hargrove writes that

[t]he way to develop a law of force and self-defense that will be taken
seriously by real world states is not to appoint the Court or any other
body to such a futile function. It is to do what the Charter already does:
permit real force to be resisted by force, but scrupulously require that the
defense fit the conduct defended against.
Hargrove, supra note 185, at 139.
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victim state and its allies create an insurgency in the aggressor state as a
proportional response? Can the created insurgency be bigger than the aggressor
state's involvement in the victim state's guerrilla movement? At what point does
a proportionate response become an illegal intervention, use of force, or armed
attack?
The liberal progressive hierarchy of proportional responses cannot
satisfactorily handle such asymmetrical possibilities. The liberal realist
perspective takes a different tact in which proportionality refers not to matching
the precise type of violence used by the aggressor but rather to ending the
aggressor's illegal activity in the least destructive manner. This means that if the
least destructive response would be direct military action by the victim state and
its allies against the insurgency support system inside the aggressor state, then
such a response is proportional self-defense. Proportionality under liberal realism
does not condemn a state victimized by a foreign-supported insurgency to
countermeasures within its borders if the aggressor state suffers from no
insurgency of its own.
The problem with liberal realism's proportionality perspective is that it
requires the weighing of potential consequences of different self-defense responses,
which is a very daunting requirement. The requirement raises all kinds of
questions about how a liberal realist determines what constitutes the least
destructive response to an aggressor's illegal activity in a given situation. Was
funding the Contras the least destructive response to Nicaragua's aggressive
behavior? As will be examined in Part IV, proportionality questions play a
central role in analyzing the Reagan Doctrine as a liberal realist policy.
The liberal realist critique of international law on the use of force is much
more sophisticated than the realist rejection of international law. Even with the
failure of all the liberal progressive tradition's legal mechanisms, liberal realism
maintains that rules still apply to the use of force and self-defense. The lack of
reciprocity erodes much of the legal status of the rules, producing a liberal-based
ethic that tries to accommodate realistic conclusions about the state of
international relations with liberal goals. Now, the second strand of the liberal
realist critique of the liberal progressive tradition will be traced.
2. Liberal Realism and International Politics
The fundamental confusion in the liberal progressive tradition is whether
changes in international political conditions (interdependence, demilitarization,
and democratization) will produce the legal mechanisms needed for legal progress
or whether adopting the legal mechanisms will lead to the political conditions
needed for legal progress. In most of the criticism of the Reagan administration,
attention focuses on the legal mechanisms without much, if any, reflection on
the then-existing international political conditions facing American foreign
policy. Liberal realism insists in the strongest possible terms that political
conditions will determine the strength or weakness of international law. While
the liberal progressive tradition sees law as superseding politics, liberal realism
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views international law as a reflection and continuation of international politics
by other means.
The tendency for lawyers and jurists to consider law as distinct from politics
has been noted in both the domestic and international realms. Shklar calls this
tendency "legalism" and comments that legalism's "urge to draw a clear line
between law and non-law has led to the constructing of ever more refined and rigid
systems of formal definitions. This procedure has served to isolate law
completely from the social context within which it exists."'2°6 The response to
the attempt by orthodox American legal thinkers to separate law and politics20in7
domestic society was the "legal realist" movement of the interwar period,
which challenged the notion that law and politics could be divided into
independent spheres.
In international relations, the liberal progressive tradition saw "the
replacement of politics by law as the solution to all the problems of international
conflict." 20 8 The liberal progressive interpretation of the prohibition on the use
of force, with its hierarchy of thresholds and responses developed from strict
conceptual analysis, matches the description of an "ever more refined and rigid
system of formal definitions" characteristic of legalism. 20 9 Liberal realism, in
many respects, serves as a response to the legalism of the liberal progressive

206. Shklar, supra note 141, at 2. The urge manifested itself in domestic American
legal thought in the late nineteenth century: "The effort of late 19th century orthodox
legal thinkers to create an autonomous systems of legal doctrine was the most
important expression of their desire to sharply separate law from politics.... Above
all, they sought to represent legal reasoning as fundamentally different from political
or moral reasoning . .

. ."

Morton Horwitz, Reinterpreting Legal Realism 64 (1990)

(unpublished manuscript, Harvard Law School).
207. See Horwitz, supra note 206, at 4 ff.
208. Shklar, supra note 141, at 139.
209. Shklar notes that the idea of legal progress is "a matter of projecting ...
legalism onto the world scene. Just as domestic society is seen in terms of legalistic
categories, so is the international world." Id. at 142. The attempt to purify
international law from international politics appeared during the Reagan years in
abundance. Henkin, a critic of the Reagan administration, provides an example of
legalistic thinking:
In our decentralized international political system with primitive
institutions and underdeveloped law enforcement machinery, it is
important that Charter norms ... be clear, sharp, and comprehensive;
as independent as possible of judgments of degree and of issues of fact;
as invulnerable as can be to self-serving interpretations and to
temptations to conceal, distort, or mischaracterize events.
Henkin, supra note 2, at 60. Falk, another Reagan administration critic, attempts the
same purification: "It challenges, as well, the conscience of American citizens,
raising the crucial question as to whether we believe the national interest is served by
a foreign policy that is not bound by impartial interpretations of international law."
Falk, supra note 106, at 108.
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tradition. Similar to the legal realist, the liberal realist on the international level
rejected the liberal progressive tradition's tendency to subordinate politics to legal
reasoning and "acknowledge[d] that law is a form of political action, among
others, which occasionally is applicable and effective and often is not. It is not
an answer2 10to politics, neither is it isolated from political purposes and
struggles."
The stark contrast between the liberal progressive and liberal realist traditions
on this point vividly appeared in Nicaragua v. U.S. Counsel for Nicaragua
argued, and the ICJ agreed, that the use of force issues central to the dispute were
susceptible to resolution by legal reasoning. 2 1 1 The Reagan administration
contended that conflict in Central America could not and would not be resolved or
even helped by an ICJ attempt to substitute law for politics.2 12 The Reagan
administration further believed that Nicaragua's motive in filing the suit had
2 13
nothing to do with legal progress but instead represented audacious realpolitik.
While the Reagan administration argued about political circumstances and
conditions, liberal progressives focused on the prohibition on the use of force and
the ICJ. The liberal progressive argument that, even if the political claims of the
Reagan administration against Nicaragua were true, the United States,
nonetheless, acted illegally symbolizes the extent to which the Reagan
administration's critics subordinated political reality to legal reasoning. As
Rostow pointed out, "[c]ritics of the United States' policy towards Nicaragua tend
of Nicaragua's support for revolutionary
to slide over, or ignore, evidence
2 14
activity" in Central America

Nicaragua's American lawyers, Abram Chayes and Paul S. Reichler, both
slid over political conditions. Chayes stated that "whatever Nicaragua has done,
it has not launched an armed attack on anybody." 2 15 The focus seems to be
exclusively legal: the conception of "armed attack." Chayes appears to make no
effort to examine what Nicaragua actually did and the political and moral
ramifications of such behavior. Reichler slid over politics by calling the Reagan
210. Shklar, supra note 141, at 143.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 120-139.
212. See discussion on reciprocity supra text accompanying notes 164-171.
213. Ambassador Kirkpatrick wrote:
For Nicaragua, the party that has initiated the violation of international
law through the use of violence against its neighbors, to seek recourse
before the International Court of Justice amounts to nothing more or
less than a cynical effort aimed at influencing world opinion,
Congressional votes, and performing all the other functions of
propaganda. Nicaragua seeks, in short, to use the Court in a blatantly
propagandistic manner.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 165, at 65.
214. Rostow, supra note 193, at 441.
215. John N. Moore, The Secret War in Central America 136 n.16 (1987).

88

Arizona Journal of Internationaland Comparative Law [Vol. 11, No. 1

administration's accusations of Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador's civil war
"simply falsifications designed to justify an otherwise indefensible policy." 2 16

The many sources implicating Nicaragua in exporting revolution and terror in
Central America must repiesent, under Reichler's theory, a grand conspiracy of
the Reagan administration, other governments, the media,
falsification between
2 17
and universities.

The ICJ's handling of the facts and circumstances also proved characteristic of
the liberal progressive proclivity to ignore political realities. Two examples
from the case are illustrative. First, the ICJ decided that El Salvador had made no
request for the United States' help and had not declared itself a victim of
Nicaraguan aggression. As Moore and Turner point out, El Salvadoran leaders in
public statements repeatedly complained about Nicaragua's aggression against2its
18
people and their need for American assistance to resist the aggression.
Apparently, the ICJ would be satisfied with nothing short of a special,
formalistic public announcement, which supposedly has legal significance beyond
repeated public statements by public officials. The ICJ makes no attempt to
explain why it took this position beyond an obvious skepticism towards the
veracity of El Salvador's claims because of its close association with the United
States. Further, Moore wonders "how the majority of the Court could maintain
this position in the face of the Salvadoran petition to the Court manifestly
declaring the attack and assistance, and the Court's own denial of El Salvador's
request to appear, is, if possible, even harder to understand." 2 19 Apparently, not
only did the ICJ want a formal proclamation but it also wanted that proclamation

216. Reichler & Wippman, supra note 12, at 463.
217. Reichler and Chayes, moreover, never did get their story straight. In 1985,
they admitted to the New York Times that "the Managua Government supplied
weapons to Salvadoran guerrillas for the big January 1981 offensive against the
United States-backed Government in El Salvador." Shirley Christian, Nicaragua's
Lawyers Prepare Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at A23. Yet, as counsel to
Nicaragua, they allowed Nicaraguan officials to testify before the ICJ that Nicaragua
had never supplied any assistance to Salvadoran rebels. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(Judgment of June 27), at 1 24 (Schwebel, J., dissent). Then, Chayes' and Reichler's
"key witness to rebut the United States charge that the Sandinistas were aiding the
Salvadoran guerrillas," Christian, supra, at A23, David McMichael, a former C.I.A.
analyst, admitted under questioning from Judge Schwebel that he believed that "the
Nicaraguans supplied arms to the Salvadoran insurgency." U.S. Policy Goes on Trial,
N.Y. Times. Sept. 30, 1985, at 85. Then, in a 1986 article, Reichler stated that "even
if it were true that Nicaragua provided support to the Salvadoran guerrillas for their
January 1981 offensive ... ." Reichler & Wippman, supra note 12, at 466. Such
factual gymnastics do not inspire confidence in the integrity of Chayes' and Reichler's
handling of political fact and circumstance.
218. See Robert Turner, Nicaragua v. United States: A Look at the Facts 78-81
(1987).
219. Moore, supra note 191, at 155; see also Sofaer, supra note 187, at 58.
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to have been given at an earlier, unspecified time. This decision shows the
imprint of legalism.
Second, the ICJ formulated evidentiary rules that epitomize legalistic
reasoning. The ICJ gave more weight to evidence "against interest" than to "selfinterested" evidence. The ICJ said that testimony "emanating from high-ranldng
official political figures, sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of particular
probative value when they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavorable to the State
represented by the person who made them. They may then be construed as a form
of admission." 220 The ICJ, therefore, thought that disinterested witnesses and
evidence against interest were more credible. These evidentiary rules are bizarre
when one considers that the litigants represent a closed, totalitarian society and an
open, democratic society. Franck comments:
The principal disadvantage to the United States, however, derives from
the nature of fact-centered litigation pitting a closed against an open
society. Nicaragua was able to prove its allegations of fact almost
entirely with evidence provided by Americans, ranging from statements
made by the President to assertions by members of Congress, a former
CIA agent, journalists, academics and human rights investigators. This
gave Nicaragua an enormous litigating advantage over the United States,
which could scarcely expect a closed society to permit its citizens to
provide evidence of Nicaragua complicity in the El Salvador insurgency.
Indeed, Nicaraguan officials uniformly attested to the nation's innocence
of all wrongdoing. Inevitably, the United States had to rely on
photographs, documents and statements, much of which the Court...
appeared to discount as "self-serving." 22 1
The ICJ's evidentiary rules assume in a very formalistic manner that the two
litigants are just alike: two non-descript states before an impartial tribunal. The
ICJ, with the exception of Judge Schwebel, never asks if the nature of the two
political regimes has any significance in the case. 222 The ICJ's handling of the
evidence reflects a presumption that once states come before the Court critical
political issues play no role in finding facts. This is legalism in its highest
form.

Critics of the Reagan administration complained that the administration
twisted international law to fit politics. The examples of Chayes, Reichler, and
the ICJ, however, show liberal progressives skewing politics to configure with
rigidly interpreted rules of international law. There is, however, a deeper point

220. Franck, supra note 180, at 117.
221. Id. See also Moore, supra note 191, at 159.
222. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27), 1 139 (Schwebel, J., dissent).
The New York Times reported that Judge Schwebel was "the only judge to question
Nicaragua's witnesses in depth." U.S. Policy Goes on Trial, supranote 217, at 85.
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here that captures a fundamental problem liberal realists have with the liberal
progressive tradition. While the liberal progressive tradition historically included
a belief that legal progress depended on establishing measurable interdependence,
demilitarization, and democratization, liberal progressives, at least in the
Nicaragua v. U.S. context, curiously do not address the manifest lack of any of
the political conditions deemed necessary for legal progress. 2 23 Where is the
argument that the Reagan administration should respect the legal rules and
institutions of legal progress because the international system enjoys tangible
interdependence, demilitarization, and democratization? Such an argument, of
course, cannot be made because the "legalistic approach to peace yielded only
principles and rules, not security of expectations among states, nor a legal
community." 22 4 Legal
progress, in other words, has made no impact on
2 25
international politics.
Chayes, Reichler, and others neglect the political aspect of their own liberal
progressive tradition. The neglect, moreover, reached perverse proportions in
Nicaraguav. U.S. In this case, liberal progressives worked for, supported, and
cheered the use of international legal mechanisms by a Marxist-Leninist
dictatorship run by individuals whose ideology, intentions, actions, and allies
repeatedly proved hostile to liberal values and politics. When critics of the
Reagan administration emasculated the idea of legal progress by neglecting
political conditions in siding with a dictatorship, they tainted an honorable
tradition.
Liberal realism, however, concentrates on the very political conditions
neglected by liberal progressives in Nicaragua v. U.S. The lack of meaningful
interdependence, demilitarization, and democratization in international politics
drastically reduces international law's potential to make tangible contributions to
the liberal objective of controlling force in international politics. Liberal realism

223. As Aron stated, "those who want to be idealists have an almost unlimited
capacity for not seeing reality." Raymond Aron, Peace and War 710 n.7 (1966).
224. Shklar, supra note 141, at 140.
225. As Bull pointedly asks, "Is the 'progress' of international law in our own
times, perceived by the international lawyers, anything more than its heightened
protest against the facts of international politics?" Bull, supra note 28, at 151. Aron
also asks:
Should we conclude that international law is making progress or is in
decline? . . . Personally, I confess I cannot see much progress ....
One does not judge international law by peaceful periods and secondary
problems. With regard to crises, that is, international conflicts, one
would seek in vain for a symptom of progress. If the goal is peace by
law, we are still as far away from it as ever. If the goal is merely the
limitation of a war that is legal for both belligerents, we are further
from the goal than at any other moment since the end of the wars of
religion.
Aron, supra note 223, at 731, 733.
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argues that liberal thought "needs to free itself from the illusions of 'the rule of
law' ideologists" because such illusions only "prevent[] liberalism from facing up
to the realities of contemporary politics." 226 The belief in the possibility of
legal progress plays a large part in "the rather colossal fiasco of liberalism in
,,227
world affairs .

C.

The Liberal Realist Ethic

1. The Spirit of the Ethic
Liberal realism, as noted above, does not descend to the pessimism of
classical realism. Instead, liberal realism represents a different kind of realism,
one that "discerns a hopefulness - no less significant for its remarkably low
opinion of human nature: the promise of cleverly designed checks and balances
and a shrewdly exercised prudence reveal a limited but genuine faith in the
possibility of international progress." 228 Liberal realists, in other words, refuse
to groan and keep silent in the cave of the Cyclops.
The liberal realist tradition embodies the attempts of liberal realists to strike
a balance between recognizing harsh international realities and preserving liberal
principles and hopes. The balance, however, cannot be struck by legal reasoning
alone. Alexander Hamilton was one of the first individuals to formulate a liberal
realist perspective, and his thinking still manages to capture the essence of liberal
realism. 2 29 Hamilton the realist argued that hoping "for a continuation of
harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties... would
be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the
accumulated experience of the ages. ' 2 30 He warned against "the tenets of those
who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehension of discord and hostility between the
States ...,,231 The primary consideration and duty of the statesman, therefore,
2
the statesman has to filter all legal and moral
was vigilant self-interest; 23233
concerns through self-interest.
Hamilton the liberal argued that the statesman's conception of self-interest
should not be narrow and unyielding. Hamilton believed that notions of self-

226. Shklar, supra note 141, at 142.
227. Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 395.
228. Gellman, supra note 37, at 262.
229. Coll writes that "it was Hamilton who best embodied the early republic's
thoughtful realism towards international law underlying the founders' public pieties."
Coll, supra note 5, at 109.
230. Hamilton, supra note 195, at 140.
231. Id. at 142.
232. Id. at 143.
233. Id. at 146.
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interest should include moderate goals and a respect for the legitimate interests of
other states. He wrote that in international affairs "it is of real importance to
conciliate the good opinion of mankind. '23 4 Hamilton favored moderation in
statesmanship because:
we ought not lightly to seek or provoke a resort to arms, that, in the
differences between us and other nations, we ought carefully to avoid
measures which tend to widen the breach; and that we should
scrupulously abstain from whatever may be construed into reprisals, till
after the employment of all2 35
amicable means has reduced it to a certainty
that there is no alternative.
Finally, Hamilton cautioned 2that
self-interest should be sensitive to the fallibility
36
of the statesmen at the helm.
Hamilton the liberal realist, then, conceived of a self-critical foreign policy
of "ljiustice and moderation, united with firmness ... ."237 Hamilton's liberal
realism led him to believe "that to respect international law was to the benefit of
the United States and that a reputation for gross violations of it would damage the
nation's commercial and diplomatic interests. However, the often unclear rules of
international law had to take account, and be interpreted in light of, U.S. selfinterest." 23 8

The same integration of liberal purpose and political realism appears in the
thought of another key figure in the liberal realist tradition: Reinhold Niebuhr.
Niebuhr played a central role in the re-invigoration of liberal realist thought at the
end of the Second World War. According to McGeorge Bundy, Niebuhr was
"probably the most influential single mind in the development of American
'2 3 9
attitudes which combine moral purpose with a sense of political reality."

234. Id. at 148.
235. Id. at 154.
236. Id. at 147.
237. Id. at 151. Wolfers notes that Hamilton's analysis belongs to an AngloAmerican tradition in which "statesmen were urged to combine two basic goals: one,
the primary though prudently conceived objective of self-preservation . .. the other
implied in such prudence, a fulfillment of the moral law to the maximum compatible
with the primary duty of defense." Wolfers, supra note 145, at xxvii. Coll observes a
continuation of this liberal realism in the Republican internationalists of the early
decades of the twentieth century; individuals like Lodge, Taft, and Hughes "were aware,
as Hamilton was, of the distinctiveness of the international arena and of the need to
balance a judicious respect for international law and organization with calculations of
U.S. self-interest." Coil, supra note 5, at 109-10.
238. Coll, supra note 5, at 109.
239. Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr and the Emergence of the Liberal Realist
Faith, 1930-1945, 38 Rev. of Pol. 244, 245 (1976). George Kennan said of Niebuhr:
"He was the father of us all." Id.
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Niebuhr captured the liberal realist perspective on political force, power, and
violence when he wrote that
[ain adequate political morality... will try to save society from being
involved in endless cycles of futile conflict, not by an effort to abolish
coercion in the life of collective man, but by reducing it to a minimum,
by counselling the use of such types of coercion as are most compatible
with the moral and rational factors in human society and by
discriminating between the purposes and ends for which coercion is
used4o
Hamilton's and Niebuhr's teachings indicate that a liberal realist foreign
policy seeks to craft an international order capable of sustaining international
intercourse characterized by minimal force and violence. If statesmen manage to
create the requisite political conditions, then a realistic perspective on
international politics will have been a productive ally of liberal principle and
purpose.
One could argue that seeking moderation in international violence can be a
goal of realism, in that moderation best suits self-interest without regard to
liberal values. It would seem to be difficult to distinguish between a realist
arguing for moderation and a liberal realist arguing for moderation. This
difficulty does indeed exist, but the distinction is still valid and important. A
realist may argue for moderation in the use of force because moderation confers
benefits on his state. Self-protection and self-aggrandizement are realism's only
substantive goals; the political nature of the regime does not matter. Prudence
serves as the guiding principle of realism, but prudence is relative to whatever
values the realist subscribes.241 The neutral prudence principle forms part of
realism's "ethics of struggle."
A liberal realist always argues for moderation of international violence
because unrestrained force threatens not only the security of the liberal state but
also liberal values such as individual rights, democracy, international order, and
human solidarity. Liberal realism's guiding ethic is a mixture of prudence and
conviction. 242 The liberal realist Aron captured this mixture in what he called an

z'

240. Niebuhr, supra note 151, at 233-34.
241. The term "ethics of struggle" is Raymond Aron's. See Stanley Hoffmann,
Raymond Aron and InternationalRelations, in Janus and Minerva, supra note 37, at
63.
242. This mixture is similar to Wolfers' definition of prudence: "expediency guided
and moderated by morality and wise judgement." Wolfers, supra note 145, at xiii.
Coll's analysis is similar as well: "Prudence is not only a moral and political
objective, but also a form of ethical reasoning .... The two key elements of prudence
are the effort to balance competing and worthwhile goals, and the definition of a moral
or legal obligation by reference to its particular context." Coll, supra note 174, at
614. The liberal realist concept of an ethic of prudence and conviction has its original
roots in Locke, who wrote that in foreign affairs the state "is much less capable to be
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"'ethics of wisdom' which takes into account both the necessity to calculate
forces, i.e. the duty of selfishness which states must obey, and the aspiration to
universality, i.e. to a victory of that part of human nature which is not a 'beast of
prey.' 243 The mixture of prudence and conviction characterizes the liberal realist
ethic.
There is no magic formula in balancing prudence and conviction in the
liberal realist ethic. In relation to the use of force, the immediacy of the threat or
use of force and the potential damage inevitably makes the balance favor
prudenoe. Since the liberal progressive tradition promotes an ethics of law,
which is essentially an ethics of conviction, 24 4 it fails to integrate adequately
prudential concerns, particularly concerns raised when there is little reciprocity on
the international law on the use of force. Liberal realism's prudential
presumption in relation to force means that liberal conviction has limited scope.
Liberal realism's objective of minimizing force in international politics,
therefore, restricts what can be done for individual rights, democracy, international
order, and human solidarity. If liberal realist policies succeed in establishing
needed political conditions for controlling international violence, then the
limitations on other liberal values will become less severe. Only in certain
circumstances, then, can prudence and conviction converge.
The tension in the liberal realist ethic between prudence and conviction, and
the influence of political conditions on that tension, is evident in the liberal
realist perspective on the rules on the use of force. Under liberal realism, any
illegal use of force (direct or indirect aggression) by a state triggers the right to
individual and collective self-defense. Any action taken in self-defense must be
proportional, meaning that the least destructive response should be taken. The
problem, then, becomes determining whether the benefits expected in terms of
self-interest and liberal values outweigh the undesirable consequences to selfinterest and liberal values.
2. The Reasoning of the Ethic Regarding Aggression
The liberal realist ethic combines deontological and utilitarian reasoning.
This mixture produces a set of rules and assumptions for cases of direct and
indirect aggression. In the case of direct aggression, the deontological rule would
be that a liberal state can respond in individual self-defense to direct aggression
directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws ... and so must necessarily be left to
the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in to be managed for the public
good." Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 397. See also Aron, supra note 223, at 722.
243. Hoffmann, supra note 241, at 63.
244. Liberal progressivism "was moralistic . . . insofar as the legal rules that
would become supreme embodied either the Kantian ethics of unconditional and
universal categorical imperatives (e.g. avoidance of aggression, and of violations of
treaties) or the utilitarian ethics of the greatest good for the greatest number."
Hoffmann, supra note 37, at 75.
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against itself or in collective self-defense when another state suffers direct
aggression. This rule is identical to the liberal progressive conception of selfdefense in cases of armed attack. The utilitarian rule in the case of direct
aggression is that the least destructive force should be used, which is that
effective force that credibly will produce the least harm to self-interest and liberal
values. This rule closely resembles the proportionality requirement in the

Christian Just War theory: that the force used be proportional to the stakes. 245 In
cases of direct aggression, the stakes for self-interest are likely to be high, which

will lead to the use of very destructive force at the expense of liberal values (e.g.,
the killing of civilians). The utilitarian rule of the liberal realist ethic, therefore,
means that the least destructive force implies that the foreseeable and actual harm
to liberal values be reduced as much as possible. 246

-

An important assumption accompanies these deontological and utilitarian
rules. The liberal realist ethic assumes that a victim of direct aggression is
worthy of collective self-defense from the perspectives of liberal self-interest and
values. 247 The legitimacy of the use of force in collective self-defense against

direct aggression, then, depends on political context. 24 8 The American experience
in Vietnam demonstrates the importance of this liberal realist assumption. The
official American position that the United States responded in collective selfdefense of South Vietnam against aggression from the North lacked legitimacy
because the South Vietnamese government was not democratic. The legal
principle that direct aggression can legitimately be opposed by collective selfdefense is not ethically compelling when a corrupt, inept, and illiberal
government controls the victim state. The Vietnam experience illustrates the
inherent tension in the liberal realist ethic between self-interest (strategic and
245. On the Christian Just War theory, see Hoffmann, supra note 63, at 47 ff.
246. I borrow this idea from Walzer's revision of the Christian Just War theory's
principle of double effect. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 151-59 (1977).
The principle of double effect holds that if the morally acceptable effects of a
legitimate use of force outweigh the unintended evil effects (e.g., killing of civilians),
then the resort to force is just. Walzer revises this principle because he believes it
"provides a blanket justification." Id. at 153. Instead, Walzer demands "that the
foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible." Id. at 155.
247. This assumption is also implicit in the Christian Just War theory. Just War
theorists in medieval times, for example, would not have argued that the Just War
theory applied to aggression between two infidel states, nor probably if a Christian
state attacked an infidel nation. The Christian Just War theorists built the doctrine
upon an understanding of the shared interests and values of Christendom, which means
that the theory had an inherent test of moral legitimacy and worth. See Hoffmann,
supra note 63, at 50.
248. Under the liberal progressive position, however, an armed attack in whatever
context triggers all the rights of self-defense. The liberal progressive principle is
designed to be neutral and therefore legally precise, which is why the behavior of
states does not correspond to liberal progressive neutral, sharp legal rules. The liberal
realist ethic, by contrast, recognizes the moral importance of context and attempts to
include it.
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political threat of totalitarian aggression) and liberal values (the human cost of
ending North Vietnamese aggression). Although containing aggression is itself a
liberal value, it does not have hegemony in the liberal kingdom of ends. The
solution to this problem is to improve the political conditions of the
international system so that aggression and force are minimized.
In cases of indirect aggression, the deontological rule holds that a liberal state
can respond in collective self-defense with a state victimized by indirect
aggression. The utilitarian rule is the same as in the case of direct aggression:
only the least destructive force should be used, which is that force that will stop
the aggression and credibly produce the least harm to self-interest and liberal
values. A number of important assumptions accompany these rules. First, as in
the case of direct aggression, the victim state must be worthy of collective selfdefense by a liberal state. In the case of indirect aggression, however, the moral
worth of the victim state comes under much closer scrutiny because (1) its
legitimacy is being challenged by internal insurgents; and (2) collective selfdefense against indirect aggression holds the potential for serious escalation in
military violence. Second, the liberal realist ethic assumes that the indirect
aggression could not be stopped by diplomatic or economic249means. Third, the
least destructive force must have a credible chance of success.
3. The Ethic and the Reagan Administration's Collective Self-Defense
Atrment
In keeping with the liberal realist tradition, the Reagan administration argued
that its policy towards Nicaragua was justified by collective self-defense because
of Nicaragua's indirect aggression against El Salvador. The Reagan
administration selected two force responses to Nicaragua's indirect aggression:
direct United States mining of Nicaraguan harbors and support for the Contra
rebels.
The Reagan administration had a strong case that Nicaragua engaged in
indirect aggression against El Salvador. Two days after Nicaragua filed its
application against the United States in the ICJ the New York Times reported
that "Western European and Latin American diplomats [in Managua] say the
Nicaraguan Government is continuing to send military equipment to the
Salvadoran insurgents and to operate training camps for them inside
Nicaragua. " 50 Further, "Western diplomats appear to be convinced of the general

249. The second and third assumptions borrow from the Christian Just War theory
as well. The Christian Just War theory held that force must be a last resort and that the
force used must have a reasonable chance of success. Hoffmann, supra note 63, at 48.
250. Stephen Kinzer, Salvador Rebels Still Said to Get Nicaraguan Aid, NY.
Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at Al. For further information regarding Nicaraguan
involvement in destabilizing neighboring countries, see Alberto R. Coil, Soviet
Arms and Central American Turmoil, 148 World Aff. 7 (1985).
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accuracy of American reports on the military ties between Nicaragua and the
Salvadoran rebels." 25 1 In Senator Moynihan's words, the United States had "a
right of action" against Nicaragua.2 52 The Reagan administration, thus, seems to
have cleared the deontological hurdle of the liberal realist ethic.
Liberal progressives, however, effectively managed to weaken the Reagan
administration's deontological stance. The administration had to spend a
considerable amount of energy trying to convince people that the Sandinistas
were indeed engaged in indirect aggression against El Salvador. The argument of
Nicaragua's counsel'before the ICJ that the Sandinistas had once sent some arms
to the Salvadoran rebels but that Nicaragua "was not supplying arms to El
Salvador either now or in the relevant past"2 5 3 bedeviled the Reagan
administration because the issue had been framed in the public eye as a simple
problem of legal evidence and proof. This legalistic paradigm began to shape the
public debate. A New York Times editorial advocated that "the Administration
produce its evidence, proclaim its countermeasures and justify them by the norms
of United States democracy and foreign policy." 2 54 Ironically, that editorial
appeared in the same issue of the New York Times as the report that Western
European and Latin American diplomats in Managua were convinced that the
United States was right about the indirect aggression of the Sandinistas.
Unfortunately, the Reagan administration allowed the legal progressives to set the
framework for the debate, which indicates both the strength of the legal
progressive tradition and the Reagan administration's failure to appreciate that
strength.
The second problem the Reagan administration had at the deontological step
of the liberal realist ethic was in assuming that El Salvador was a morally worthy
state for American collective self-defense. The specter of right-wing death squads
haunted the Reagan administration's efforts to build support for El Salvador's
democratic potential. Duarte's election in 1984 and his subsequent efforts,
however, improved El Salvador's image and eased the Reagan administration's
burden. Nonetheless, the specter had proven extremely difficult to shake; and the
Reagan administration's deontological case suffered as a result.
The Reagan administration had even more problems with the means with
which it came to the collective self-defense of El Salvador. The Contra policy
will be examined in Part IV, but here I will analyze the mining of Nicaragua's
harbors. To abide by the liberal realist ethic, the mining of Nicaragua's harbors
must have (1) been a last resort measure; and (2) had a credible chance of
contributing to the successful termination of Nicaragua's support for El

251. Kinzer, supra note 250, at Al.
252. Moynihan, supra note 12, at 65.
253. Robert Turner, Peace and the World Court: A Comment on the Paramilitary
Activity Case, 20 Vand. J. Trans. L. 53, 73 (1987). See also Christian, supra note
217, at A23.
254. Illegal, Deceptive and Dumb, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at A26.

98

Arizona Journalof Internationaland Comparative Law [VoL 11, No. 1

Salvador's rebels. Further, the harbor mining had to be the least destructive
alternative.
The Reagan administration ran into serious difficulties on the utilitarian step
of the liberal realist ethic. Since the Reagan administration mined harbors in
February-March 1984,255 even before imposing economic sanctions in May
1985,256 it is difficult to argue that the mining constituted a measure of last
resort. Second, the mining strategy did not have a credible chance of contributing
to the termination of Nicaragua's support for El Salvador's rebels because
Americans were not barred from trading with Nicaragua in 1984, which meant
that American nationals and property were at risk of being mined by Americanlaid mines. If an American ship had been sunk by one of the mines, then the
entire Reagan administration policy in Central America might have collapsed like
a house of cards in the wake of the domestic political backlash. Third, it is
doubtful that the mining constituted the least destructive alternative for two
reasons. First, American self-interest would have been badly damaged if the
mines had sunk American vessels or those of allied or friendly states. Obviously,
the idea was to stem the flow of military supplies from Cuba and the Soviet
Union; but mines are indiscriminate weapons, incapable of picking out Cuban
and Soviet arms vessels from commercial ships. Second, the victims of mine
explosions would most likely be civilian merchant seamen, which raises the
question of protecting liberal values.
Although the liberal realist tradition informs the Reagan administration's
collective self-defense argument, the mining policy does not seem compatible
with the utilitarian rule and assumptions of the liberal realist ethic on indirect
aggression.

D.

Political Goals of the Liberal Realist Tradition

The final part of the liberal realist tradition addresses the international
political conditions that the liberal realist ethic needs to lessen the tension
between self-interest and liberal values in situations involving the use of force.
The two critical conditions are a balance of power and a trend favoring the spread
of liberal democracy in the international system. The behavior of the Reagan
administration exhibited concern for these two conditions of the liberal realist
tradition, further strengthening the case that the Reagan administration was not
working under purely realist assumptions.

255. See Martin Tolchin, Senate, 84-12, Acts to Oppose Mining NicaraguanPorts;
Rebuke to Reagan, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at Al.
256. Stuart Taylor Jr., Reagan's Power Wide Under Emergency Law, N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1985, at A10.
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1. The Balance of Power
For the liberal progressive tradition, the balance of power symbolized all that
was repugnant about international politics. The evil perpetuated under the
balance of power inspired liberal progressives to search for principles of
international order based on law. From the perspective of the liberal realist,
however, the liberal progressive legal alternatives to the balance of power fail to
provide foundations for international order. The liberal realist perspective also
does not see the balance of power as hostile to international law; in fact, it views
the balance of power as a necessary condition for the functioning of international
law.
The liberal realist tradition has, since the days of Hamilton, appreciated a
close relationship between the balance of power and international law. This close
relationship figured prominently in the thought of Vattel, who greatly influenced
statesmen and diplomats in the latter part of the eighteenth century. As Lang
notes, Vattel and those he influenced argued that "a balance of power system
presented perhaps the only guaranty of the public law of Europe." 2 51 The
relationship between the balance of power and the law of nations was so close in
of the law of
Hamilton's opinion that maintaining the balance of power was part
258
nations in that states could punish a state threatening the balance.
The idea that international law needs a balance of power represents a
recognition that international law cannot properly function without some type of
international order. Since the eighteenth century, and perhaps earlier, the balance
of power has been a mechanism for providing order in a world of independent,
sovereign states.2 59 As the liberal progressives have pointed out, the balance of
power contains the potential for dangerous disorder as well. Absent a better
mechanism that has a realistic chance to supersede it, however, the balance of
power remains the basic source of international order. As such, international law
relies on the order produced by the balance of power created by the states in the
international system. 26
Under the influence of the liberal progressive tradition, the balance of power
virtually disappeared from international legal literature in the twentieth
257. Lang, supra note 195, at 162. See also Alfred Vagts & Detlev F. Vagts, The
Balance of Power in InternationalLaw: A History of an Idea, 73 Am. J. Int'l L. 555,
562 (1979).
258. Lang, supra note 195, at 101.
259. On the balance of power generally, see Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical
Balance of Power (1967) and Bull, supra note 28, at 101-26.
260. "As many international lawyers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
freely recognized ... " Coll observes, "international law prospers best in the soil of
a balance of power." Coll, supra note 5, at 110-11. Perhaps the most famous
statement adhering to the international legal importance of the balance of power came
from a progressive, Oppenheim, who wrote that the balance of power is "an
indispensable condition of the very existence of International Law." Vagts & Vagts,
supra note 257, at 570.
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century. 26 1 From the liberal realist perspective, this neglect of the balance of
power constitutes a fundamental mistake. Even some liberal progressives critical
of the Reagan administration acknowledge the validity of the liberal realist
emphasis on a balance of power.2 62 Under the liberal realist view, a balance of
power provides support for reciprocity in international law and deters aggression.
The balance of power is supposed to be a moderating influence on the behavior of
states, helping to minimize violence in international relations. As a result, the
balance provides security for content states and disincentives for discontented
states desiring to upset the status quo. Thus, liberal realism recognizes that
liberal states must keep watch over the balance of power and must be ready to act,
with force if necessary, to uphold the balance of power from aggressive, violent
efforts to change it.
The Reagan administration's foreign policy exhibited the concern with the
balance of power characteristic of the liberal realist tradition. As Tucker points
out, the Soviet Union clearly "was making a serious bid to expand its global
position and influence" at the end of the Carter administration.2 63 The Soviet bid
to change the balance of power most dangerously manifested itself in increasing
Soviet superiority in conventional and nuclear military power and in expanding
Soviet activity in the Third World. 264 Ambassador Kirkpatrick hammered on
these same themes on behalf of the Reagan administration. Kirkpatrick noted
that in the 1970s "the Soviet Union undertook a military buildup probably
unprecedented in the world outside of the time of total war. ' 265 Kirkpatrick also
emphasized Soviet activity in the developing world:
Northern and southern and central Africa, the Middle East and Asia,
Central and South America and the Caribbean, have all in the past
decade become targets of Soviet-sponsored efforts at destabilization and

261. Vagts & Vagts, supra note 257, at 579.
262. Perkins writes:
Today, with the lessons of the Cold War still fresh, there must be few
who believe that the world can rely on law and disregard considerations
of the balance of power ....
A world balance of power is a precarious
security, but it is the best there is, and it is the only road to law....
Our national interest in the balance of power is in providing the basis
for a legal order in which the freedom and independence of nations can
be respected.
John Perkins, The Prudent Peace: Law as Foreign Policy 24, 26, 27 (1981).
263. Tucker, supra note 38, at 2. See also Gottlieb, supra note 161, at 48; and
Rostow, supranote 166, at 288.
264. Writes Tucker: "[The] impressive Soviet arms buildup was attended by a
persistent and unprecedented effort by Moscow to expand its influence in the
developing world." Tucker, supra note 38, at 1.
265. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, A World of Independent Nations, in Legitimacy and
Force, supra note 6, at 361.
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takeover. The functional scope of Soviet expansion has enlarged
alongside its expanding geographical focus: sea lanes, strategic minerals,
culture have become operational objects of Soviet
space, and
266
ambition.
The Reagan administration's concern with Soviet ambitions in Central
America figured prominently in forging its foreign policy for that region. 267 The
administration's foreign policy towards Central America strongly displayed both
self-interest and liberal conviction. Kirkpatrick prudently argued that it would be
"bad for the United States for there to be installed one-party, Marxist-Leninist
states integrated into the Soviet bloc and willing to have their territory serve2 6as8
bases for the projection of Soviet military power in the hemisphere."
Kirkpatrick also emphasized the Reagan administration's liberal convictions in its
Central American policy: "We do not think it is moral to leave small countries
and helpless people defenseless against conquest by violent minorities which are
armed and trained by remote dictatorships.... We believe our political goal, a
requires building democracies, not the
more democratic and stable hemisphere,
2 9
multiplication of dictatorships." 6
One policy chosen by the Reagan administration to incorporate prudential
and liberal ends was to support the Nicaraguan Contras. The administration
hoped to blunt the threat to the balance of power posed by Soviet and Cuban
support for Nicaragua and El Salvador's communist guerrillas by supporting the
Contras. The concept was that, first, American support for the Contras would
force Nicaragua to end its role in funneling Soviet bloc arms to El Salvador's
guerrillas. 270 Second, the Contra policy would force the Sandinistas to
democratize the Nicaraguan political system by allowing opposition parties to
exist and free and fair elections to take place. 2 ' 1 If these two steps succeeded,

266. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Most Dangerous Time, in Legitimacy and Force,
supra note 6, at 384.
267. Gottlieb, supra note 161, at 50.
268. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Moral Equivalence, in Legitimacy and Force, supra note
6, at 68.
269. Id.
270. As President Reagan said in 1983:
[L]et us be clear as to the American attitude toward the Government of
Nicaragua. We do not seek its overthrow. Our interest is to ensure that
it does not infect its neighbors through the export of subversion and
violence. Our purpose, in conformity with American and international
law, is to prevent the flow of arms to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala,
and Costa Rica.
Rostow, supra note 193, at 454.
271. President Reagan told the New York Times that the Contra policy "would stop
when [the Sandinistas] keep their promise and restore democratic rule and have
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El Salvador's government could defeat the isolated communist guerrillas with
American military and economic assistance; and the United States could continue
to prod El Salvador towards strengthening its democratic process without fear of
destabilization. If the policy worked, the United States' strategic interests in the
region would have been protected and democracy would prevail over Soviet-backed
totalitarianism. A successful policy would have produced benefits for American
self-interest and for liberal values.
In terms of the liberal realist tradition, the Contra policy required that the
United States be able and willing to support the use of force. According to the
Reagan administration, Nicaragua's support for the El Salvadoran rebels
constituted an illegal use of force that activated El Salvador's right of self-defense,
under which the United States could come to the defense of El Salvador. The
Reagan administration, then, adhered to the deontological rule of the liberal realist
ethic: the United States was able to use force in collective self-defense of El
Salvador.
Liberal realism's concern with the balance of power necessitates that liberal
states must be willing to use power and force to support the balance of power
against threats hostile to self-interest and liberal values. The Reagan
administration believed that it was necessary to counter the Soviet threat in order
to purge the "intense emotional resistance against the use of U.S. power for any
purpose" created by the American experience in Vietnam. 272 Again, the Reagan
administration's perspective included prudence and liberal conviction. Kirkpatrick
suggested that "[w]hat is called the conservative revival is just this: the return of
American confidence in our values, and in our capacities, and of American
determination to protect ourselves - from war and defeat." 273 Kirkpatrick also
emphasized the broader liberal conviction in the Reagan administration's
willingness to use American power:
The restoration of the conviction that American power is necessary for
the survival of liberal democracy in the modem world is the most
important development in U.S. foreign policy in the past decade. It is
the event which marks the end of the Vietnam era, when certainty about
the link between American power and the survival of liberal democratic
2 74
societies was lost.
The Reagan administration's sensitivity to the prudential and liberal aspects
of the balance of power and its willingness to use American power to confront

elections." See Hedrick Smith, Ambiguity in U.S. Goals, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984,
at Al.
272. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, A Liberal Position?,in Legitimacy and Force, supra
note 6, at 30.
273. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Doctrine 111, in Legitimacy and Force, supra
note 6, at 446.
274. Kirkpatrick, supra note 6, at 398-99.
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threats to self-interest and liberal values illustrate well the liberal realist
tradition's perspective on the balance of power.
2. Trend Towards a Homogenous Liberal International System
One of the political conditions that the liberal progressive tradition deems
necessary for legal progress was the democratization of states and of the
international system as a whole. The liberal realist tradition similarly holds that
an increasing presence of liberal democratic states in the international system will
help moderate the system and reduce the frequency and ferocity of armed conflict.
While the balance of power serves as a negative check on international violence,
the spread of liberal democracy in the international system provides a positive
influence on state behavior. 275 As more liberal states populate the international
system, opportunities for prudence and conviction converging in foreign policy
greatly increase. Since a liberal state will have to confront the difficult calculus
of the utilitarian rule in the liberal realist ethic less frequently, the tension in the
ethic eases significantly. Opportunities for legal and moral behavior increase,
allowing reciprocity to return to harden the liberal realist ethic on the use of force
into international law.
The major controversy in the liberal realist tradition focuses on the means of
achieving a more homogenous liberal international society. On one side are
liberal realists who doubt that intervention or counterintervention contribute
positively to promoting democracy in the international system. On the other side
are liberal realists who believe that intervention and counterintervention can
promote democracy in the international system. The penultimate part of this
essay will explore this controversy by examining the Reagan Doctrine, and will
try to come to a conclusion as to whether the liberal realist tradition should
welcome or reject pro-democratic intervention and counterintervention.

IV.

A.

THE REAGAN DOCTRINE: BEYOND THE LIBERAL
REALIST TRADITION?

What is the Reagan Doctrine?

Since it was never formally announced as a foreign policy doctrine, the
Reagan Doctrine has been subject to many and various interpretations.

275. For evidence that liberal states do not fight one another, see Michael Doyle,
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, pts. I & II, 12 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 205, 323

(1983).
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Determining the proper characterization of the Reagan Doctrine will be crucial to
exploring its relation to the liberal realist tradition.
Perhaps the best way to locate the essence of the Reagan Doctrine is to
compare it to another liberal realist doctrine: the Truman Doctrine. The Truman
Doctrine embodied the concept of containment: the United States would support
governments threatened by insurgency movements supplied and encouraged by
totalitarian regimes. Containment flows from the liberal realist ethic: the United
States can come to the collective self-defense of a state victimized by a threat or
an illegal use of force. President Truman described the doctrine that bears his
name in this way: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who resist attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures." 276 This was the basis for American support for El Salvador
in the face of an insurgency supported and
supplied by Nicaragua, Cuba,
277
Vietnam, North Korea, and the Soviet Union.
The Truman Doctrine represents a policy of defensive containment: keeping
totalitarian forces contained within their current extent. The assumption was that
if totalitarianism could be contained, totalitarian states would gradually lose their
universalistic fervor for revolution and mellow into status quo states.278 The
Truman Doctrine is identical to Hume's notion that "the pursuit of balance of
power policy would increase the probability that oppressive states with
universalistic pretensions would over time modify their goals and reform their
inner nature." 279
The Truman Doctrine, however, did not address the prospect that containment
may fail. The reactive, defensive spirit of the Truman Doctrine could only
recover from a totalitarian success by hoping that containment would work the
next time around. The Reagan administration, however, came to power
determined to address what it perceived to be the failure of containment. As
Kirkpatrick points out, Soviet interventionary activity produced nine new
communist dictatorships in the five years prior to Reagan's inauguration: South
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Nicaragua,
and Afghanistan. 28 0 "Soviet development of a global interventionary capability,"
according to Tucker, "had been seen by many as a serious blow to the promise
initially held out by the policy of containment." 2 81 Reagan had frequently
attacked the policy of containment as a candidate for the presidency,2 82 and he was

276. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights,
and InternationalLaw, in Right v. Might, supra note 2, at 26.
277. On the scope of foreign involvement in El Salvador's rebellion, see generally
Moore, supra note 215, and Turner, supranote 218.
278. See George F. Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 Foreign Aff. 566
(1947).
279. Lang, supra note 195, at 38.
280. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 276, at 23.
281. Tucker, supra note 38, at 11.
282. Id.
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that "the policy of containment initiated by President
not alone in believing
2

Truman has flagged." 3
The perceived failure of containment posed a difficulty for liberal realists.
Prudence and conviction demanded a response to containment's failings. The
2 84
Reagan administration's response became known as the Reagan Doctrine.

Simply defined, the Reagan Doctrine stands for the proposition that the United
States is politically and morally justified in providing economic and military
support to indigenous insurgencies fighting totalitarian governments dependent
on the Soviet bloc.285 The Reagan Doctrine appeared to have three goals: (1) to
redeem containment by bogging down the Soviets in those places where they
apparently had triumphed; active anti-communist insurgencies would force the
Soviets to pour money and material into their imperial periphery, taking away
Soviet incentive to destabilize other regimes; 28 6 (2) to shatter the MarxistLeninist myth of the irreversibility of proletarian revolution by helping anticommunist forces challenge the legitimacy of the totalitarian regimes; 287 and (3)
if possible, to force totalitarian regimes from power by either (a) forcing them to
concede to the anti-communist insurgents' demands for democratizing the
country's political system; or (b) overthrowing the totalitarian regime. 288 The

283. Rostow, supra note 166, at 288.
284. Kirkpatrick notes that
the Reagan Doctrine . . . developed in response to the Soviets'
objective of a global empire and in response to Soviet claims of
legitimacy in their imperial venture embodied in the Brezhnev Doctrine
and the doctrine of "national liberation wars." More specifically, the
Reagan Doctrine was a response to the Soviet Union's efforts to
hurriedly establish Marxist-Leninist governments in Third World
countries and incorporate these into its "socialist world system."
Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 276, at 23.
285. Id. at 20.
286. Turner writes that the Reagan Doctrine "is still essentially defensive in
purpose, and, like traditional containment, it is premised on the idea that armed
international aggression must be made unprofitable if it is to be deterred." Turner,
supra note 29, at 129.
287. Tucker notes that the Reagan Doctrine has an offensive inspiration in that
"[i]ts intent is to show that communist revolutions are indeed reversible, thereby
exploding a crucial myth." Tucker, supra note 38, at 14. Kirkpatrick also stressed
that the Reagan Doctrine "denies the Brezhnev Doctrine's claim that communism is
irreversible." Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 276, at 21.
288. Hoffmann characterized the Reagan Doctrine as a new version of the old rollback doctrine, which espoused taking back by force territory occupied by the Soviet

Union. See Stanley Hoffmann, Ethics and Rules of the Game Between the
Superpowers, in Right v. Might, supra note 2, at 90.
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Reagan Doctrine, then, constituted a curious hybrid of containment, ideological
attack, and roll-back.289

B. Is the Reagan Doctrine a Liberal Realist Strategy?

An important question was asked by Kirkpatrick: "Is it morally and legally
acceptable for the United States to support armed indigenous movements against
these [repressive] governments?" 290 Liberal progressives would argue that the
United States cannot legally use indirect force to coerce another state. Under the
liberal progressive tradition, the Reagan Doctrine supports illegal intervention
and illegal uses of force, which might, depending on the size of the effort
amount to an armed attack.
A liberal realist analysis of the Reagan Doctrine begins with the fact that the
government in question came to power through the use of force and intervention
by foreign, totalitarian powers. To argue, as the liberal progressives do, that the
United States should obey the international legal rules on the use of force and
nonintervention despite the wanton violation of both rules by the Soviet bloc
again points to the problem of reciprocity. The lack of reciprocity on the use of
force and on nonintervention removes from those principles purely legal
obligations. The liberal realist ethic, therefore, must face the political scenario
the Reagan Doctrine was created to confront.

Since the communist intervention has already succeeded under the Reagan
Doctrine scenario, the deontological reasoning for the Reagan Doctrine will have
to be different from the deontological rules for self-defense against aggression.
The deontological rule might take the following form: a liberal state can
intervene in a state where an indigenous insurgency is challenging a repressive
government that came to power with the support of foreign totalitarian powers.
Tucker sensed just such a rule when he observed that the Reagan Doctrine
"declares that intervention
may be justified in order to overturn governments that
'29 1
are illegitimate.
It is important, however, not to define the Reagan Doctrine's deontological
rule too narrowly or too broadly. Would the Reagan Doctrine, for example,

289. The most apt description of the Reagan Doctrine came from George Will, who
characterized it as "containment plus". Will wrote that "the Reagan Doctrine is
tradition modified in the light of evidence." See George F. Will, Tradition - Plus
Evidence, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1985, at A19.
290. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Doctrine II, in Legitimacy and Force, supra
note 6, at 434.
291. Robert Tucker, Exemplar or Crusader?:Reflections on America's Role, Nat'l
Interest, Fall 1986, at 64, 67. Elsewhere Tucker writes that the Reagan Doctrine
"proclaims a new international order in which the legitimacy of governments will no
longer rest simply on their effectiveness, but on conformity with the democratic
process." Tucker, supra note 38, at 13.
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justify intervention on behalf of pro-democracy insurgents against a dictatorial
government not dependent on foreign support? If the answer to that question is
positive, then the Reagan Doctrine's deontological rule would be very broad: a
liberal state can intervene in a state where an indigenous insurgency is
challenging a repressive government. If the answer is negative, then a crucial
circumstance for the Reagan Doctrine is that the repressive government must be
dependent on foreign support. Kirkpatrick answers the question negatively when
she wrote that "it is legitimate for the U.S. to support an insurgency against a
dictatorial government that depends on external support." 292
Another question must be asked at this point: does the insurgency movement
have to support self-government as well as self-determination? In other words, do
the insurgents have to believe in democracy? The answer to this may seem
obvious given the Reagan administration's emphasis on the Contras democratic
objectives. But the administration's steadfast support of the Islamic guerrilla
fighters in Afghanistan was not premised on the democratic credentials of the
nujahedeen but rather on the principle of self-determination for the Afghan
people. The Reagan administration's emphasis on the external role of totalitarian
states suggests that the Reagan Doctrine embodies a rule of intervention for selfdetermination rather than self-government. Thus, the Reagan Doctrine might not
justify intervention for self-government and might not require that the indigenous
insurgency adhere to liberal, democratic principles.2 93 This formulation of the
Reagan Doctrine is identical to John Stuart Mill's belief that intervention to
support self-determination is justified, but not intervention for self-government,
is the precondition for the development of liberal,
because self-determination
2 94
democratic politics.
But this seems unsatisfactory because, if the Reagan Doctrine is merely a
principle of intervention for self-determination, it looks like the mirror image of
the Soviet argument that it could support national liberation movements under
the principle of self-determination. 2 95 The Reagan Doctrine clearly has a
substantive concept of self-determination that embodies liberal values that cannot
be equated with the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is very difficult for a liberal realist to
separate intervention for self-determination and for self-government.
A liberal progressive would argue that the Soviets likewise have a
substantive concept of self-determination and, thus, that international law must
292. Kirkpatrick, supra note 290, at 437.
293. Kirkpatrick appears to stress the self-determination emphasis of the Reagan
Doctrine when she wrote that the Reagan Doctrine "insists on the moral and legal
rights of people to defend themselves against incorporation into an empire based on
force. It affirms the moral and legal right of the United States to assist those people."
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Doctrine , in Legitimacy and Force, supra note 6, at
429.
294. See John S. Mill, in The Anglo-American Tradition, supra note 45, at 214-

15.
295. See John N. Moore & Robert Turner, International Law and the Brezhnev
Doctrine 61-66 (1987).
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be neutral between the two concepts. The liberal realist ethic, however, rejects
any notion of the moral equivalence between democracy and totalitarianism.
Instead, liberal realists argue that the neutrality propounded by the liberal
progressives has been "altered to the disadvantage of the United States and other
democracies." 296 Earlier this article noted how closely the neutral principles of

the liberal progressive paralleled the Soviet bloc position. Arguments favoring
neutral principles and, thus, moral equivalence "impose[ costs disproportionately
on liberal, democratic nations" because only liberal nations take the rule of law
seriously. 297 The liberal realist ethic, therefore, has no qualms about believing
in the moral superiority of the liberal conception of self-determination.
The only way to make sense of the self-determination/self-goverment
problem is to identify the two branches of the Reagan Doctrine. The first branch
sets out the deontological rule that support for an indigenous insurgency is
justified in a case where a repressive state has invaded and occupied another state.
This was the situation in Afghanistan and Cambodia.
The second branch is more complicated. The important requirements are: (1)
a repressive state; (2) brought to power by and dependent on outside repressive
powers; and (3) an indigenous insurgency seeking to end repression and imperial
status. In this situation, the insurgency's fight for self-determination must
reasonably resemble a fight for self-government. In other words, under the
Reagan Doctrine's second branch, the rebels must possess credible democratic
credentials. This can be the only meaning of Kirkpatrick's recurrent theme that
the "Reagan Doctrine rests on the traditional American doctrine, stated in the
Declaration of Independence, that the legitimacy of a government depends on its
298
respect for individual rights and on the consent of the governed."
The Reagan Doctrine, therefore, contains two deontological rules for two
different circumstances. In the case of an invasion of a state by a repressive
foreign power, intervention to help an indigenous insurgency movement's quest
for self-determination is justified. There seems to be a more relaxed emphasis on
the moral worth of the insurgency in this situation than under the liberal realist
ethic on direct or indirect aggression. In the case of an indigenous insurgency
movement fighting a repressive regime dependent on the support of outside
repressive powers, intervention is justified if the rebels seek self-government. In
this case, the question of the moral worth of the insurgency seems more
important than under the liberal realist ethic on direct or indirect aggression.
The utilitarian reasoning of the liberal realist ethic for the Reagan Doctrine
differs from that used in cases of aggression. Since the Reagan Doctrine is

296. Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "InternationalLaw," Nat'l Interest, Winter
1989/90, at 3, 10.
297. Id. For more on the liberal realist critique of moral equivalence, see Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, Moral Equivalence, in Legitimacy and Force, supra note 6, at 61 and
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Myth of Moral Equivalence, in Legitimacy and Force, supra
note 6, at 74.
298. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 276, at 22.
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"offensive" rather than "defensive," the utilitarian reasoning should require more
than minimized destruction. The utilitarian rule should be that intervention for
self-determination or self-government should produce more benefits than costs for
liberal self-interest and values.
How does the Contra policy stand up to the liberal realist standards for the
Reagan Doctrine? With respect to the deontological rule on intervention for selfgovernment, the Reagan administration encountered great difficulties in keeping
and broadening support for the Contra effort because it appeared to many that the
Contra movement was not indigenous or democratic. The Sandinistas played
upon these concerns in their ICJ application when they stated that "[t]he United
States has created an 'army' of more than 10,000 mercenaries - many of whom
served the former dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle .... 299 Although the
United States did not create the Contra movement, 3° ° the Reagan administration
was vulnerable to the attack that the Contra effort really was not indigenous.
Verified Contra attacks on civilians and human rights abuses did much to erode
the liberal credentials of the Reagan administration's "freedom fighters. '30 ' The
democratic objectives of the Contra forces never seemed to emerge clearly enough
for the Reagan administration's ethical right of intervention to remain
convincing. 30 2 The Reagan administration's difficulties with the democratic
illustrate the
credentials and the indigenous origins of the Contra forces
30 3
importance of the deontological step in the liberal realist ethic.
Assuming that the Reagan administration cleared the deontological hurdle,
we must determine whether the benefits of the Contra policy to American selfinterest and liberal values outweigh the costs to both. Hoffmann, for example,
argues that the costs of the Reagan Doctrine are objectionable:
The costs may be low for the United States, but we in fact would
impose extremely heavy costs on the innocent populations that would
be the victims of the subversive or insurrectionary movements we
supported. Indeed, the costs may be far heavier for those 4populations
3°
than for the regimes we are trying to weaken or to destroy.
Hoffmann's concern grows out of the realization that civil wars provoke violence
on both sides that rips apart liberal values of individual life, liberty, property,
299. Application of the Republic of Nicaragua, 1 1, at 1-2.
300. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27), 1 93.
301. As Hoffmann put it, "the moral worth of the forces we supported is, to put it
mildly, highly uneven." Hoffmann, supra note 288, at 90.
302. See Moore, supra note 215, at 163-70, for the democratic objectives of the

Contra forces.
303. Turner senses exactly this when he observed that "the United States has done
a rather poor job of explaining the legal basis for its actions in Central America, and
this is to be deeply regretted." Turner, supra note 39, at 165.
304. Hoffmann, supra note 288, at 90.
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domestic order, and the rule of law. 30 5 Hoffmann's argument suggests that a
strategy premised on fomenting civil war is unlikely to produce benefits in terms
of liberal values:

[I]t is not at all clear that the pursuit of the Reagan Doctrine would
serve the cause of human rights and justice. As for the other important
values -

order and peace - it is precisely their importance that has

explained, in the past, why the "cold warriors" themselves chose a
policy of containment rather than one of roll-back or liberation. The
Reagan Doctrine['s] . . . likely effects are neither order

democracy. 306.

. . .

nor

Under this analysis, the Reagan Doctrine's intervention for the selfgovernment branch can never qualify as a liberal realist strategy since it
ostensibly seeks to moderate violence in the international system (by
containment plus) through the immoderate means of promoting civil wars. This
aspect of the Reagan Doctrine instead appears to be solely the product of an ethic
of conviction, where the ends justify the means. Certainly much of the Reagan
administration's rhetoric about its support for freedom fighters rings of universal
conviction. 30 7 As Kirkpatrick pointed out, the theme of individual freedom and
self-government in the Reagan Doctrine "stands in sharp contrast to the
conception of
foreign policy as a matter between states... or as governed by
30 8
realpolil-ik."
Could it be that the Reagan administration was too idealistic in formulating
the Reagan Doctrine? Is the Reagan Doctrine simply another example of
America's attachment to an "historical purpose" and "crusading spirit" to make
the world safe for democracy? Tucker argues that "what was striking about the
policy of implementing the Reagan Doctrine was the caution and moderation that
marked it." 3°9 Tucker notes that the Truman Doctrine, a supposedly more
limited liberal realist strategy, "evolved into the policy of global containment, a

305. The fear of the illiberal horror of civil war goes back to the Founding Fathers.
General George Washington worked diligently to create a disciplined, European-style
army during the Revolutionary War because of his "fear of the tendency of irregular
warfare, with its violations of the international rules of war, to tear apart the entire
social contract .... " R.F. Weigley, American Strategy from Its Beginnings through
the First World War, in Makers of Modem Strategy 408, 412 (Peter Paret ed., 1986).
306. 'Hoffmann, supra note 288, at 90.
307. "Identification with universal aspirations to freedom," Kirkpatrick said, "is

squarely in the American tradition of support for freedom, self-determination, national
independence everywhere." Kirkpatrick, supra note 293, at 428. If this interpretation
is accurate, then the liberal progressive criticism of the Reagan administration's
realism is still off the mark.
308. Id. at 427.
309. Tucker, supra note 38, at 14.
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3 10
policy that proved neither modest in means nor prudent in calculation."
Kirkpatrick may not, therefore, be wrong to claim that the Reagan Doctrine was

more modest and less sweeping than the Truman Doctrine.3 1 1 In fact,

Kirkpatrick stressed that the Reagan Doctrine "seeks to marry idealism and
prudence .... " 3 12 Tucker concurs by stating that the Reagan Doctrine "provides
example of [Reagan's] ability to balance two quite different
an instructive
313
worlds."

From the perspective of self-interest, the Reagan Doctrine embodied a foreign
policy of highly selective uses of limited American military support for
indigenous insurgency movements. According to Turner, the Reagan
administration supported insurgencies against regimes that either seized power
forcefully by relying on Soviet and/or Cuban military support or exported
revolution to neighboring states in violation of international law.3 14 The Reagan
Doctrine, therefore, never amounted to a general campaign to overthrow
unfriendly governments 3 15 or a "crusade against communism." 3 16 Since its
scope was limited, the Reagan Doctrine required relatively small commitments of
American resources and no combat forces. The Truman Doctrine, by contrast, led
to massive American military expenditures and troop commitments in setting up
military alliances and bases around the world to contain the Soviet power. The
Reagan Doctrine, in contrast, promised dramatic benefits for American interests at
very little cost.
But what about the benefits and costs in relation to liberal values?
illiberal
Hoffmann argued powerfully on the premise that civil wars produce
3 17 The first
horrors while containment upheld the values of peace and order.
response to Hoffmann is that containment's failings placed the international
balance of power, and thus peace and order, in danger. Containment holds up no
liberal values if it is ineffective. The very inadequacy of containment inspired the
Reagan Doctrine. The second response to Hoffmann is that long term benefits to
liberal objectives might yet outweigh the short term costs to liberal values.
There is evidence that this assertion may prove to be credible. As Turner notes,
"one of the most obvious consequences of the Reagan Doctrine is how effectively
it appears to be working." 3 18 The Reagan administration's support for the
mujahedeen played a prominent role in forcing the Soviets to retreat in
humiliation from Afghanistan. Further, American support for UNITA in Angola
contributed to an agreement by the Cubans and Soviets to pull Cuban troops out

310. Id.
311. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 276, at 21.
312. Kirkpatrick, supra note 293, at 431.
313. Tucker, supra note 38, at 13.
314. Turner, supra note 29, at 126.

315. Id.
316. Tucker, supra note 38, at 14.
317. Hoffmann, supra note 288, at 90.
318. Turner, supra note 29, at 127.
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of Angola. United States involvement with the democratic Cambodian resistance
also helped pressure Vietnam to ends its occupation of Cambodia. Only in
Nicaragua did the Reagan Doctrine appear to fail; but some controversially give
the Contra policy credit for forcing the Sandinistas319to hold a free and fair election
in late February 1990, which the Sandinistas lost.
In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, the Reagan Doctrine's
goals of redeeming containment and shattering the myth of irreversible
communist power were achieved. The last goal, achieving self-government, had
only been precariously achieved in Nicaragua. The question whether the policy
successes enumerated above provide more benefits for liberal values of peace,
international order, self-determination, self-government, and individual rights than
costs cannot be answered definitively either way since the long term picture is not
well developed at the moment. But we can engage in some informed speculation
regarding the Contra policy.
In relation to American self-interest, the Contra policy may have promised
dramatic benefits at very little cost for the United States; but the policy had
diplomatic and political costs for the United States in Central America, Latin
American, and Western Europe. But, it does not appear that these costs seriously
hurt the United States in the international community. One might argue that
whatever benefits for American interests emerged from the Contra policy and
other Reagan Doctrine efforts are better explained by other phenomenon, like
Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy. 320 Gorbachev undoubtedly had an
impact and deserves some of the credit for the communist retreats. The claims for
the Reagan Doctrine, however, are not incompatible with Gorbachev's
involvement in the process. It is not clear that Gorbachev would have acted to
retrench Soviet power if the United States had not been putting pressure on the
periphery of the Soviet empire. Utilitarian analysis of self-interest, in the end,
does not point clearly one way or the other.
In relation to liberal values, a generous reading of the consequences of the
Contra policy might claim as benefits for liberal values the redeeming of
containment, the shattering of the myth of irreversible socialist revolution, the
reduction of totalitarian influence in Central America, and the introduction of
democracy to Nicaragua. The cost of these benefits, however, are measured by
the many thousands of Nicaraguans killed, injured, displaced, violated, and
oppressed during nearly ten years of civil war. 321 How does one determine if the
costs to liberal values outweigh the benefits?

319. "Conservatives in this country praised the results as a vindication of the
Reagan Administration's unswerving support for the Contras." Elaine Sciolino,
Turnover in Nicaragua; Americans Laud Result But Differ on the Moral, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 1990, at A14.
320. On Gorbachev's "new thinking," see David Holloway, Gorbachev's New
Thinking, 68 Foreign Afr. 66 (1989).
321. On these costs, see On Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua (Marlene
Dixon ed., 1985).
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It is important to note that the benefits and costs represent different types of
liberal values. The benefits that relate to the reduction of totalitarian influence in
Central America and the international system can be characterized as "third image"
values because they relate to the international political system. Kenneth Waltz
distinguished three "images" in his analysis of the causes of war. The "first
image" cause of war is human nature; the "second image" cause is the state; and
the "third image" cause is the international system. 32 2 I am distinguishing
between third image liberal values (relating to the international system), second
image liberal values (relating to the type of governments in states), and first
image values (relating to individual rights). The achievement of democracy in
Nicaragua is both a third and second image liberal value. By contrast, the costs
of the civil war are predominantly costs to first image values. The Reagan
Doctrine may in the long run, through Nicaraguan democracy and the reduction of
communist influence in the international system, contribute benefits to first
image liberal values.
The distinction between first, second, and third image liberal values helps
locate the liberal emphasis of the Reagan Doctrine. As in the Contra policy, the
emphasis was on third and second image liberal values. This should not seem
unusual given the liberal realist emphasis on the balance of power and a trend
towards a homogenous liberal international system. For this reason, intervention
for self-government under the Reagan Doctrine is consistent with the liberal
realist tradition.
The harder question is at what point do costs to first image liberal values
outweigh second and third image benefits so as to move the Reagan Doctrine
beyond the liberal realist tradition. Prudence and conviction converge more easily
on third and second image liberal values, meaning that first image liberal values
fall more often into that zone of tension between self-interest and liberal values
noted above. I argued earlier that the only way liberal realists could avoid this
tension was by keeping a balance of power and encouraging the liberalization of
the international system. As the Reagan Doctrine shows, the liberal realist ethic
faces the awful paradox of having to sacrifice first image liberal values in order to
achieve a situation where first image values are less at risk.
The paradox is awful, perhaps tragic, because it forces liberal realists to
gamble with the fundamental essence of liberal philosophy, individual rights, on
the hope that individual rights will be more secure in the future. The liberal
progressive tradition confronts a similar paradox. Liberal progressivism's strict
rules and legalisms demonstrate a desire to protect first image liberal values; yet
the positions of the liberal progressives place second and third image liberal
values in jeopardy in a hostile international system, which then places first image
values at risk.
The Reagan Doctrine offered the prospect of reducing the tension in the
liberal realist ethic, but it did not escape that tension. Many would argue that the
Reagan administration inflicted too much suffering on innocent Nicaraguans for
322. See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (1959).
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the Contra policy to be justified and that there were other, less violent,
alternatives to achieve the second and third image values. That may very well be
the case, but I do not think that the practice of the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua
means that the theory of the Reagan Doctrine belongs outside the liberal realist
tradition. Given the pattern of consequences of the Contra policy in Nicaragua,
however, the Reagan Doctrine is at the very edge of the tradition, straining the
tolerance of the liberal realist ethic almost to the breaking point. It is, for that
reason, a part of the liberal realist tradition that is to be more feared than revered.

V.

CONCLUSION

I began this article with three objectives: (1) to analyze critically the
conventional wisdom about the Reagan administration's handling of the
international law on the use of force; (2) to examine whether the Reagan
administration's policies against Nicaragua fit within the liberal realist tradition;
and (3) to explore the difficulties liberal thought has in dealing with the use of
force in international politics. In relation to the first two objectives, I concluded
that (1) the conventional wisdom about the Reagan administration on the use of
force does not demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of either the Reagan
administration's liberal realist perspective or the liberal progressive tradition that
inspired the critique of the Reagan administration; and (2) (a) the mining of
Nicaragua's harbors does not satisfy the demands of the liberal realist ethic on
collective self-defense against indirect aggression; and (b) the Contra policy in
theory fits within the liberal realist tradition but that its practice may have
violated the rules of the liberal realist ethic on intervention for self-government.
My analysis of the various traditions of liberal thought on international law
and politics indicate the extent of the difficulty international relations poses for
liberal thought. Liberal progressives and realists start with the same belief in the
need to deal with international politics in order to assure better prospects for
individual rights within states; they also believe in the necessity for a trend
towards more democratic states in the international system. The similarities
between these two traditions, however, end there. The Reagan years provide
excellent examples of how the two traditions diverge and how the traditions react
to an international system marked by increased tension, animosity, and conflict.
Liberal progressives abandoned the political conditions imbedded in the liberal
progressive tradition and retreated deeper into legalism. Liberal realists, in
confronting the failure not only of international law but also of containment,
formulated policies that put enormous strain on the liberal realist tradition,
bending and sometimes breaking its ethic.
I do not believe that the Reagan administration's liberal realist efforts or
those of the liberal progressives represent great advances for liberal thought in
international politics. Although I have more sympathy for the Reagan
administration's position than I do the liberal progressive stance, I cannot pretend
that the Reagan administration escaped the disturbing position liberals have been

19941

Liberal Thought

in since the Enlightenment. The anarchy that is international politics too often
forces believers in a political and moral philosophy premised on individual rights,
democracy, and peace to choose between self-interest and liberal values and
between different types of liberal values. The liberal realists of the Reagan years,
like many liberals before them, took their turn as liberalism's Sisyphus, ushing
liberal concerns up the anarchical mountain of international relations. 2 3 The
effort was neither in vain nor completely successful.
The collapse of the Soviet empire during late 1989 and early 1990 certainly
makes the discussion of the liberal "great debate" during darker international days
seem anachronistic. It is hard to imagine at this moment how containment and
the Reagan Doctrine will be relevant to future liberal strategies in international
politics. The coercion of international anarchy on liberal thought has dramatically
decreased with the collapse of communism. Future liberal strategies, however,
will be shaped by the traditions of liberal thought refined over the ages. For this
reason, an understanding of the liberal progressive and liberal realist traditions
during the Reagan years contains important theoretical and practical value. I hope
that this article contributes in some small way to such an understanding.

I,

323. I borrow the image of Sisyphus from Hoffmann, supra note 44, at 395.

